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Introduction
Lawmakers in the European Union and its member states,' like their
counterparts in the United States, increasingly are using economic tools to
protect the environment while reducing their focus on command and control
regulation.' The reliance on economic approaches to environmental protec-
tion may disproportionately impact low income and minority communities.
Although evidence of environmental injustice in Europe is not as strong as in
the United States, several recent studies demonstrate that traditional environ-
mental protection measures in Europe have disproportionately funneled pollu-
tion to low income connunities.3 Economic-based environmental measures
can only exacerbate that trend.
In fact, the safety nets, such as freedom of information requirements,
technical assistance provisions, opportunities for public participation, and
access to the courts, that can limit the disparate impact of economic measures,
are much weaker in Europe than in the United States.4 To some extent, this is
due to the structure of the European Union and the relationship ofthe Member
States to the Union. The lack of adequate safety nets increases the possibility
that economic approaches will exacerbate problems of environmental injus-
tice. In addition, some ofthe economic approaches that could enhance oppor-
tunities for environmental justice, such as right-to-know laws and pollution
prevention laws, are less likely to achieve these goals in Europe because the
initiatives that are being pursued are quite modest.'
At the same time, though, the economic approaches that are being adop-
ted by the European Union and its Member States include controls that are
1. Currently, the European Union includes the countries ofAustria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 1 Y.B. INT'L ORGS. 575 (Union of International
Associations ed., 32d ed. 1995-1996).
2. See infra Part I (discussing trend toward environmental regulation using economic
tools rather than command and control regimes).
3. See inffra Part III (analyzing environmental injustice in Europe).
4. See infra Part V (comparing "safety nets" in European and American environmental
measures).
5. See infra Part VI (describing environmental justice measures currently used in United
States and Europe).
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designed to reduce the impact of the laws on low income communities and the
poor.6 Furthermore, the structure ofthe European Union as well as provisions
in international treaties and constitutions of the Member States may provide
additional opportunities to limit the disparate impacts of pollution.7
This Article will compare and contrast the approaches that the United
States and the European Union and its Member States are taking to address
environmental justice issues as they move towards greater reliance on eco-
nomic tools to achieve environmental protection. Part I of the Article dis-
cusses the trend towards economic approaches, and the reasons for the trend.8
Part H1 examines the inevitable disparate impacts of economic approaches.9
Part HI analyzes the history of environmental justice in Europe.1" Part IV
outlines the economic environmental protection measures that are being im-
plemented in Europe." Part V compares the safety nets that are included in
United States and European legislation. 2 Finally, Part VI compares the
economic measures that are being used in the United States and Europe to
achieve environmental justice, such as right-to-know laws and pollution pre-
vention laws. 3
L The Trend Towards Economic Approaches to Environmental Protection
The Fifth Environmental Action Program of the European Union, 4
launched in 1993, represented a substantial change in the focus of European
policy on environmental protection." The program emphasizes the use of
"new environmental instruments," including "economic, fiscal and civil re-
sponsibility measures," "price corrections," measures to improve environmen-
6. See infra Part IV (discussing environmental justice measures and potential for dis-
parate impact).
7. See infra Part V.E-F (discussing European statutory and treaty measures).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part IIL
11. See infira Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. The Environmental Action Programs set priorities for legislation in the European
Union. See Ian B. Bird & Miguel A. Veiga-Pestana, European Community Environmental
Policy and Law: An Introduction, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AFTER 1992, at 219,222
(Ralph B. Lake ed., 1993) (stating that Environmental Action Programs spurred European
community environmental legislation). However, they are not legally enforceable instruments.
SeeLaurensJanBrinkhorstEuropeanEnvironmentalLaw,inENVIRONMENTALLAW INEUROPE
1, 3 (Neils S. . Koeman ed., 1999) (noting that programs "do not constitute a legal base for
legislative action by the EC"). The First Environmental Action Program was adopted in 1972,
and a new program is adopted, on the average, every five years. Id. at 2.
15. Id. at2-3.
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tal information and public access to information, and financial support mecha-
nisms. 6 The program stresses increased reliance on economic measures and
decreased reliance on command and control regulation. The focus on eco-
nomic measures in the Fifth Environmental Action Program is tied closely to
the concept of sustainable development that has been a central policy of
European Union environmental law since the Treaty of Amsterdam. 7
While the governing bodies of the European Union are strongly encour-
aging the use of economic measures by Member States, generally, they do not
require countries to adopt such measures."8 Instead, the European Union
creates legislative frameworks that allow Member States to implement eco-
nomic measures where necessary, according to local conditions. 9 The types
of economic instruments that are being adopted in Europe include environ-
mental taxes, tradeable permits, deposits, subsidies, environmental labeling
or certification programs, right-to-know requirements, and voluntary agree-
ments.20
16. See Council Resolution 93/138, §§ 6, 10, 1993 O.J. (C 138) 1 [hereinafter Fifth
EnvironmentalAction Program] (listing and describing new types of environmental measures
to be used in European Union).
17. See Brinkhorst supra note 14, at 2-3 (explaining development of Community
environmental policy). The policy statements in the Treaties of the European Union that
espouse sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and similar goals are not directly
enforceable in Member States, but they significantly influence the content of legislation that is
adopted by the European Union, which may be directly enforceable in the Member States. See
Brian Jones, EnvironmentalLaw in the United Kingdom, in ENViRONMENTAL LAW IN EuROPE,
supra note 14, at 561,562-63 (noting that "soft law" such as policy guidelines influence content
of legislation but are not part of United Kingdom domestic law).
18. See Michael Bothe, Economic Instrumentsfor Environmental Protection: Introduc-
tion to theEuropean Experience, in ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE AND MARKETMECHANISMS:KEY
CHALUNGESFORENVIRONMENTALLAWANDPOLICY251,256 (KlausBosselmann &Benjamin
J. Richardson eds., 1999) [hereinafter ENViRONmENTAL JusacE AN MARKET MECHANIsMS]
(explaining that although "[t]here is a lot of economic analysis of, even publicity for, the use
of economic instruments . . . [a]ctual practice, however, is limited"); Catherine Redgwell,
Privaization and EnvironmentalRegulation: A United Kingdom Perspective, in ENVJRONMEN-
TAL JUSTICE AND MARKETMCHANisMS, supra, at 257,260 (explainingthat Commission favors
frameworks for introduction of market based measures). The reluctance of the European Union
to require Member States to implement economic approaches is based, in part, on Article 175
(ex Article 130s) of the Consolidated Treaties of the European Union, which prohibits the
European Union's Council of Ministers from enacting legislation "primarily of a fiscal nature"
without the unanimous support of all of the member States. CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF TM
TREATYOFTHEEUROPEAUNIONANDCONSOLIDATEDVERSIONOFTHETREATYESTABLISHING
TM EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY, art. 175,1997 O.J. (C 340) 173-308 [hereinafter CONSOLIDATED
EU TREATIES].
19. Redgwell, supra note 18, at 260.
20. See Klaus Bosselmann & Benjamin J. Richardson, Introduction: New Challengesfor
EnvironmentalLawandPolicy,inENVIRONENTAL JUSTICEANDMARKETNE MHANISB,supra
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The Member States are adopting economic measures to address environ-
mental problems for the same reasons that the United States is adopting such
measures. Proponents assert that economic measures: (1) encourage polluters
to reduce pollution in the most cost-effective manner; (2) achieve the same
level of pollution reduction as command and control regulation at a lower
cost; (3) eliminate information-gathering burdens on government that are
necessary for command and control regulation; (4) provide incentives for
companies to develop new technologies to reduce pollution beyond levels
required by government; and (5) generate revenue for environmental programs
in some cases.21 In addition to those theoretical justifications for economic
measures, in many countries the practical impetus for the adoption of such
measures is the Kyoto Protocol.' Many industrialized countries are adopting
or considering taxes and pollutant trading programs to cut emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases by the levels required in the Kyoto
Protocol.' In addition, the economic relationships of Member States and the
elimination of market barriers within the Union, stimulates the adoption of
economic measures. As the European Environment Agency recently noted in
a report on environmental taxes, the "dispersal of traditional tax bases of
note 18, at 1, 15 (listing market-based instruments and noting "wide spectrum of mechanisms
to choose from"); Bothe, supra note 18, at 252 (listing four categories of environmental instru-
ments); Redgwell, supra note 18, at 261-62 (describing five types of environmental instru-
ments); Jeremy Rowan-Robinson & Andrea Ross, Non-Regulatory Instruments and Public
Access toEnvironmentallnformation, in ENVIRON rALJUSTICEAND MARKETMIEcHANISMS,
supra note 18, at 265, 268-73 (discussing two mechanisms: environmental agreements and tax
credits). In the United Kingdom, for instance, the government has relied on voluntary agree-
ments and environmental taxes to address pollution problems in the past, see Redgwell, supra
note 18, at262 (stating that environmental agreements are part of United Kingdom's "regulatory
landscape"); Rowan-Robinson & Ross, supra, at 268 (noting "track record" of use of environ-
mental agreements and tax credits in United Kingdom), and will likely increase its reliance on
economic instruments in the future. See Redgwell, supra note 18, at 260-61 (stating that use
of market-based instruments is "likely to increase in the future").
21. See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental
Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WAS. & LEE L. REV. 111, 113 (1999)
(addressing advantages of economic measures); see also Redgwell, supra note 18, at 260
(describing four main advantages of economic instruments).
22. See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, 31 LL.M. 849 (1992) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
23. See Taxes, Voluntary Programs, Other Policies to Cut Greenhouse Gases Common
in OECD, 31 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 860-61 (May 5, 2000) (noting that "[m]ost member
countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development are implementing
tax credits, voluntary programs with industry and other policies to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions"); European Environment Agency, RecentDevelopments in the Use ofEnvironmen-
tal Taxes in the European Union 1 (July 2000), at http'//reports.eea.eu.int/environmentaltaxes_
in-eu/enltaxes.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2001) [hereinafterEEA TaxReport] (observing that focus
on environmental taxes is strengthening due, in part, to Kyoto targets).
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capital, [labor] and consumption due to the increased mobility of production
and e-commerce increases the attraction of fixed and material factors such as
energy, land and water as tax bases. "24
As in the United States, though, economic measures in Europe are de-
signed to complement, rather than replace, command and control environmen-
tal measures.' Many of the measures rely for their success upon an underly-
ing program of government regulatory control.26
I. The Inevitable-Disparate Impacts ofEconomic Measures
While the economic approaches to environmental protection can provide
all of the benefits described above, they also may inadvertently funnel pollu-
tion to low income communities. It is well established that low income com-
munities suffer disproportionate exposure to various types of pollution under
the command and control regulatory approach in the United Statesv and
research is beginning to demonstrate similar disparities in Europe.2 To some
extent, these disparities can be attributed to economic factors.29 It has even
24. EEA TaxReportsupranote23,at 1.
25. See Bosselmann & Richardson, supra note 20, at 4 (explaining that economic
measures complement command and control methods); Bothe, supra note 18, at 251 (stating
that "lower cost or more environmental improvement at the same cost" cannot be achieved
through use of market mechanisms alone).
26. See Bosselmann & Richardson, supra note 20, at 8 (observing that although economic
instruments are understood as "market mechanisms," they "are nested within state institutional
processes"); Redgwell, supra note 18, at 260 (stating that economic instruments and command
and control devices "[e]volve together" because of need for regulatory framework to set goals
and standards); Gerald C. Rowe, Environmental Justice as an Ethical, Economic and Legal
Principle, in ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICEANDMARKETMECHANISMS, supra note 18, at 58, 70-71
(explaining that certain economic instruments "rely on an underlying prohibition and licensing
system").
27. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 117 nA0 (citing studies that indicate that landfills,
treatment facilities, and industries that emit large amounts of toxic chemicals are "sited predomi-
nantly in minority or low income communities") "[A]II environmental regulatory measures can
be expected to have distributive effects." See Rowe, supra note 26, at 66. In the traditional
command and control regime, public resource and land management, decisions regarding the
exercise of enforcement discretion, decisions regarding the permitting of polluting facilities, and
decisions regarding the cleanup of hazardous waste sites can all have redistributive effects. Id.
at 66-69. Similarly, the procedures and methods used to make environmental decisions, in-
cluding cost-benefit analysis, can raise distributional issues. Id. at 66.
28. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
29. Professor Robert Verehick described the relationship between economics and waste
disposal in the United States as follows:
While the production and disposal of waste is tightly regulated by federal law, the
geographic distribution of most types of waste is not But the absence of law is not
the absence of form. Instead, external market forces - the cost of land, the cost of
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been suggested that stringent command and control regulations can lead to the
elimination of jobs and, therefore, increase risks to low income segments of
the population.3"
The disparities that arise under traditional command and control regula-
tion inevitably will worsen as economic factors assume a more central role in
environmental decisionmaking. As Professor Cass Sunstein noted, free mar-
kets often promote discrimination when they are functioning successfully.
31
Sunstein argued that a successful market promotes discrimination because it
encourages persons to rely on stereotypes. 2 To the extent that there is a
rational basis for a stereotype, a reasonable person will rely on stereotyping
in his decisionmaking, because it is efficient to rely onthe stereotype.3 While
stereotyping may be efficient, it breeds discrimination. A free market does
not discourage such discrimination because the success of a market is mea-
sured independently of its redistributive impacts.34 A market that allocates
resources efficiently in the aggregate is a success, from an economic stand-
point, regardless of whether resources are distributed equitably among the
participants in the market.3' To some extent, therefore, discrimination in the
distribution of pollution is inevitable in an efficient and successful market.
Market failures, like market successes, can also prompt inequitable dis-
tribution ofpollution. For example, in a traditional pollutant trading program,
transportation, the cost of facing public resistance - fill the void and gradually
shape the topography of America's wastelands.... [W]aste moves from states with
higher resident per capita incomes to states with lower resident per capita incomes.
Id.; Robert R. M. Verchick, Critical Space Theory: KeepingLocal Geography in American and
European EnvironmentalLaw, 73 TuL. L. REV. 739,751-52 (1999) (citations omitted).
30. See CASS R. SuNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 302-05 (1997) (stating
that "private expenditures on regulatory compliance may produce less employment and more
poverty").
31. See id. at 4, 8, 151 (stating that "free markets can produce economic inefficiency and
(worse) a great deal of injusie ... [e]ven well functioning economic markets should not be
equated with freedom itself"); see also Bosselmana & Richardson, supra note 20, at 2 ("[T]here
is a natural tension between environmental justice and market mechanisms"); Verchick, supra
note 29, at 749 ("[ldeological forces such as free market liberalism.., do not act neutrally.").
32. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 155-57 (suggesting that "discriminatory behavior is
a response to generalizations or stereotypes that... provide a rational basis for employment
decisions").
33. Id. at 155.
34. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 119-20 (noting that "economic theory does not address
the important underlying question regarding whether an efficient allocation of resources is
socially or ethically desirable").
35. Id.; see also SUNSTEMN, supra note 30, at 6, 109-10. As Professor Sunstein noted, the
United States has the highest per capita gross domestic product in the world, but "it also has a
higher rate of children living in poverty - one in five - than does any other wealthy country in
the world." Id. at 110.
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when Company A buys from Company B the "right" to discharge pollution,
because it is cheaper for Company A to buy the "right" to pollute than to
reduce the amount of pollution that it discharges, the transaction may be "cost-
effective" for both companies. It may not, however, be an economically
"efficient" transaction if the aggregate harms to persons or natural resources
situated near Company A outweigh the benefits to Companies A and B and
the third parties.36 Traditional economic theory suggests that if the harm that
a pollution trade caused third parties outweighed the benefits to those parties,
the third parties would bargain with the trading parties to prevent the harm
and resources would, therefore, be allocated efficiently in the market.37 How-
ever, market failures will often prevent the efficient operation of the market
for environmental or health resources and prevent low-income communities
from even participating in the market.38
For a variety of reasons, third parties that are harmed by a pollutant trade
might fail to bargain with the trading partners to prevent the harm. In some
cases, while the aggregate harm to all third parties may outweigh the benefits
of the trade, no single party, or group of parties, may suffer sufficient harm to
be motivated to bargain to prevent the trade.39 In other cases, third parties
may be willing to bargain with the traders to prevent the trade, but may be
unable to pay the traders enough money to prevent the trade.4" Finally, in
some cases, the third parties will not bargain with the traders because the third
parties lack information about the potential health, environmental, and eco-
nomic impacts of the trade to recognize that the trade will adversely affect
them.4' In each of those situations, the overall harms of a trade will outweigh
the benefits, and yet the trade will be made, due to market failures.
If economic environmental protection measures may disparately impact
low income communities, should governments play a role in limiting that
impact? Free market proponents may argue that any government intervention
will interfere with the efficient functioning of the market and should, there-
fore, be discouraged. However, markets depend on governments and laws for
their existence.42 As Professor Sunstein noted, "[w]e cannot have a system of
private property without legal rules, telling people who owns what, imposing
36. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 122-23 (illustrating how market failures can lead to
inequitable pollution distribution).




41. Id.; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 327 (discussing that "information asymme-
tries" may allow dangerous products to drive safe products out of market).
42. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 9, 108 (observing that "markets depend for their
existence on law").
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penalties for trespass, and saying who can do what to whom."'43 The initial
allocation of legal rights has a profound impact on the functioning of the
market. It "serves to create, to legitimate, and to reinforce social understand-
ings about presumptive rights of ownership ... [creating an] endowment
effect."" Studies demonstrate that a person who has been allocated a right by
law will demand significantly greater compensation to surrender that right
than they would be willing to pay to obtain that right.4"
Laws and government regulations play another important role in shaping
market activity in that they foster the creation of social norms,' which signifi-
cantly influence an individual's rational choices in a free market.47 Govern-
ment can shape norms through education or persuasion initiatives, taxes and
subsidies, time, place, and manner restrictions on activities, and even prohibi-
tions of activities.4"
Therefore, markets do not act independently of government regulation,
and governments can, and should, play a role in limiting the disparate impact
of economic environmental protection measures on low income communities.
On the one hand, governments can do that by creating legal rights49 to envi-
ronmental amenities, such as the right to a clean environment. There are, how-
ever, much less intrusive ways for governments to limit the disparate impacts
of economic measures.
Governments can include provisions in economic environmental protec-
tion measures to address some of the market failures that could otherwise lead
to the disproportionate distribution of pollution in low income communities.
For instance, economic environmental protection measures could include
mechanisms to increase the availability of information and the opportunities
for public participation to address situations where third parties fail to partici-
pate in the market because they lack sufficient information to understand
the impacts that economic environmental protection measures may have on
43. Id. at5.
44. Id. at52.
45. Id. Sunstein stated:
One study found that people would demand about five times as much to allow
destruction of trees in a park as they would pay to prevent the destruction of those
same trees.. .. In another study, participants required payments to accept
degradation of visibility ranging from 5 to more than 16 times higher than their
valuations based on how much they were willing to pay to prevent the same
degradation.
Id.
46. Id. at 34.
47. Id.at8,49,52.
48. Id. at 56-57.
49. Id. at7.
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them.50 In addition, to the extent that financial disparities reduce third party
participation in the market, economic environmental protection measures
could address the disparities to some extent through grants and loans."'
Finally, economic environmental protection measures could include mecha-
nisms that foster collective organization or provide safety nets for parties that
fail to organize due to high transaction costs, in order to address the situation
where third parties to a market transaction individually lack the motivation to
participate in the market, although their collective injury exceeds the benefits
of a particular transaction."
Thus, information disclosure requirements, strong public participation
requirements, financial and technical assistance programs, environmental
assessment and planning requirements, and broad access to courts for citizens
should be vital components of economic environmental protection measures.
They are important tools that can be used to promote environmental justice in
economic environmental protection measures.
Il. Environmental Justice in Europe - A Historical Perspective
While environmental justice has been a major focus of environmental law
scholarship and policy in the United States over the past decade,53 the environ-
mental justice movement has not yet had a major impact on European law or
politics. 54 Although there are dozens of studies that document the inequitable
50. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 124 (suggesting that "market-based initiatives should
include mechanisms to increase the availability of information and the opportunities for public
participation").
51. Id.
52. Id. at 123-24.
53. See generally Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Suit Provisions: Obsta-
cles and Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 EcoLOGYL.Q. 1, 6 n.22 (1995)
(listing articles on "legal reformation in the civil rights area, challenges to discriminatory siting
through alternative state claims, and reformation of facility siting procedures for toxic waste
facilities"); Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997)
(containing bibliography of recent environmental justice literature and resources).
54. See Gordon Walker & Karen Bickerstaff Polluting the Poor: An EmergingEnviron-
mental Justice Agenda for the UK?, 2 CRrr. URB. STuD. Occ. PAPER 2-3 (1999) (describing
lack of environmental justice movement in United Kingdom) (on file with author); Telephone
Interview with Simon Bullock, Researcher, Friends of the Earth (Oct 5, 2000); Telephone
Interview with Gordon Walker, Head of Geography, Staffordshire University (Oct 5, 2000).
While environmental justice issues may be considered and debated when European countries
are involved in treaty negotiations or disputes with developing countries outside of the Euro-
pean Union concerning the export of pollution to those countries or the creation of different
standards for developing countries and developed countries, there has been relatively little focus
on environmental justice in domestic politics in the countries of the European Union. See
Telephone Interview with Simon Bullock, supra.
426
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distribution of landfills and heavily polluting facilities and disparities in
enforcement and hazardous waste cleanup rates in the United States, there are
very few studies that examine these issues in the European context.55 In
addition, non-governmental organizations have not vigorously pursued envi-
ronmental justice in Europe.
56
However, environmental justice is becoming an important issue in Eu-
rope. Leaders of the burgeoning European environmental justice movement
suggest that there are several reasons why more research has not been done,
and why the movement has not taken center stage as quickly in Europe as it
has in the United States. First, the environmental justice movement trans-
formed environmental law and politics in the United States largely due to the
work of the civil rights community. 7 So far, European civil rights groups
have not played a major role in championing the issue in their countries. 8
Additionally, it has been difficult, until recently, for researchers in the Euro-
pean Union to obtain data from government agencies necessary to conduct
studies that correlate pollution and demographic data.59 Finally, the images
that have fueled the United States environmental justice movement have not
sparked a European movement because the central issues in the United States,
hazardous waste landfills and incinerators, are not as incendiary in European
politics.'
55. See Walker & Bickerstaff, supra note 54, at 2-3; Telephone Interview with Simon
Bullock, supra note 54; Telephone Interview with Gordon Walker, supra note 54.
56. See Walker & Bickerstaff, supra note 54, at 2; Eva Berglund, Social Divisions and
Environmentalism, Remarks at the Environmental Justice in a Divided Society Conference con-
vened at Goldsmiths College, University of London (Feb. 25,2000), at http'J/www.goldsmiths.
ae.uk/academic/an/environmental2.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2001) (stating that "little has been
done to examine unequal impacts in the environmental sphere").
57. See JulianAgyeman, EnvironmentalJustice: From the Margins to the Mainstream?,
Remarks at the Equity and the Environment Conference convened by the Royal Geographic
Society (Nov. 8,2000); Telephone Interview with Simon Bullock, supra note 54.
58. See Telephone Interview with Simon Bullock, supra note 54; Telephone Interview
with Gordon Walker, supra note 54. Professor Walker suggested that one of the reasons that
civil rights communities have not played a more central role in the movement in Europe is that
"in the UK, the pattern of distribution of ethnic communities is less distinct and evidence of
'environmental racism' in facility siting less immediately apparent" Walker & Bickerstaff,
supra note 54, at 3.
59. See Walker & Bickerstaff, supra note 54, at 4; Telephone Interview with Gordon
Walker, supra note 54. Friends of the Earth postponed a study of the demographics of the
communities in which landfills are sited in the United Kingdom due to the difficulty of obtain-
ing adequate information about the types of landfills, their locations, and the hazards associated
with them. See Telephone Interview with Simon Bullock, supra note 54.
60. See Walker & Bickerstaff, supra note 54, at 3. Walker and Bickerstaff suggested that
"the high profile of toxics in the US... loaded accusations of environmental inequity with
intense political symbolism." Id.
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However, environmental justice is becoming an important issue in
European environmental law and policy, and a few important studies have
been released recently that correlate high levels of pollution with low-income
populations. The most significant of these studies was released earlier this
year by Friends of the Earth - U.K.61 The organization examined the siting
of the most heavily polluting industrial facilities in the United Kingdom,62 and
the authors of the study concluded that "the poorest families (reporting
average household incomes below £5000) are twice as likely to have a pollut-
ing factory close by than those with average household incomes over
£60,000.63 In addition, the authors concluded that "[o]ver ninety per cent of
London's most polluting factories are located in communities of below
average income."'  This was the first study completed in the United Kingdom
to examine whether pollution disparately impacts low income communities.65
While the study did not focus on the ethnic or racial composition of the
communities, the authors of the study speculated that the correlation between
economics and siting would be far greater than correlations between race or
ethnicity and siting.' The authors plan to follow up their report with a study
that examines the demographics of the communities in which incinerators are
sited, as the United Kingdom embarks on an ambitious plan to greatly expand
incineration capacity over the next few years.67 Undoubtedly, as more studies
are conducted, researchers likely will demonstrate that the tie between low
income communities and pollution is as strong in Europe as in the United
States.e6
Another recent study in the United Kingdom is focusing directly on race
and ethnicity. Professor Gordon Walker, at Staffordshire University, is exam-
61. See Friends of the Earth Trust, The Geographic Relation Between Household Income
and Polluting Facilities (1999), at http'/www.foe.co.ukleampaignsindushy_and_pollution/
factorywatch/polluionandpoverty/income and pollution.html (last visited on Feb. 6, 2001)
[hereinafter FOE Study] (indicating presence of high levels of pollution in low income areas).
62. The study examined the siting of facilities that were registered under the United
Kingdom's Integrated Pollution Control (PO) framework, and examined household income
distribution by posteode sector. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Telephone Interview with Simon Bullock, supra note 54.
66. See FOE Study, supra note 61 (stating that "poorer people in England and Wales are
more likely to live in close proximity to a potentially polluting factory than richer people").
67. See Telephone Interview with Simon Bullock, supra note 54.
68. See Ted Schreker, Money Matters: Incomes Tell a Story About Environmental
Dangers and Human Health, ALTERNATIVES, Summer 1999, at 12, 13-16 ("V]ariations in
health, and access to the most basic prerequisites for health, are inseparable from income and
its distribution .... Environmental hazards... make a direct contribution to health inequali-
ties, in rich countries just as in poor ones.").
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ining the economic and ethnic background of communities that host "major
accident hazard sites."69 Although his findings have not yet been published,
Professor Walker's research also suggests that major accident hazard sites are
usually located in lower income communities." Morever, his preliminary
analysis suggests that the sites impact Asian communities more heavily than
other ethnic groups. 1
In another sign of a burgeoning environmental justice movement, the
press is criticizing European environmental agencies and non-governmental
organizations for their failure to address the concerns of low-income and
minority communities.72 As a result, environmental groups are beginning to
champion the environmental justice cause.7" The fervor with which they are
adopting the cause can be seen in the words of the director of Friends of the
Earth-Scotland who, in announcing the organization's Environmental Justice
campaign, said "This is not going to be a respectable campaign - it is born out
of a great deal of anger and fiustration."74 In light of the fact that civil rights
groups have not yet played a central role in the movement, European environ-
mental justice advocates are focusing more heavily on issues of poverty and
pollution than on issues of race and pollution.7 Consequently, they will be
69. See Gordon Walker et al., The People and the Hazard: the Spatial Context ofMajor
Accident Hazard Management in Britain, 20 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 119, 121 (2000) ("Major
accident hazards can be broadly defined as the storage or use of hazardous substances, where
in the event of a major accident and release of toxic, explosive or flammable materials local
people and the nearby environment could be seriously affected."). Professor Walker's research
focused on "approximately 1100 installations... designated as major accident hazards through
[the United Kingdom's] Hazardous Substances Consents Regulations (1992)... [and] a smaller
subset of approximately 300 installations [that are] . .. defined as so-called 'top-tier' sites
through the [Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazard] Regulations which... implemented
the Seveso Directive." Id. at 123. Professor Walker is using the 1991 census data for the study.
See Telephone Interview with Gordon Walker, supra note 54.
70. See Telephone Interview with Gordon Walker, supra note 54.
71. Id.
72. See Christopher Cairns, Green for Stop asRacism HitsEnvironmental Organisations,
SUNDAY HERALD, Aug. 27, 2000, at 6, available at 2000 WL 23172858 (describing activist
group, Black Environment Network).
73. In its report on pollution and poor communities, Friends of the Earth - U.K. states
that "[]ustice for poor people in England and Wales must include cleaning up their environment
and reducing their exposure to health-threatening pollution." FOE Study, supra note 61; see
also Christopher Cairns, Friends of the Earth Demands 'Environmental Justice 'for Blighted
Areas, TiE SCOTSMAN, Apr. 28, 1999, at 9, available at 1999 WL 15111085 (describing
launch, by Friends of Earth Scotland, of£250,000 campaign for environmental justice).
74. See Cairns, supra note 73, at 9.
75. For instance, as part of its "environmental justice" campaign, Friends of the Earth
Scotland is calling for a "Warm Homes Bill" to address "fuel poverty." Id. Fuel poverty refers
to the inability to heat one's home due to a low income and energy inefficient heating systems.
Id.
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concerned about economic-based approaches to environmental protection that
could funnel more pollution into low-income communities. As noted in the
next section, many economic environmental protection measures could have
that impact.
IV Economic Environmental Protection Measures and Their
Potential Disparate Impacts
Economic environmental protection measures are being introduced in the
European Union and its Member States, and this section will examine those
measures and their potential disparate impacts. 6 However, before addressing
the specific provisions, it might be helpful to discuss briefly the relationship
that exists between the European Union and its Member States, the lawmaking
procedures for European Union Legislation, and the effect of such legislation
in the Member States.
A. A Primer on the European Union and Environmental Legislation
in the European Union
Although the Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic
Community in 1957 did not explicitly authorize the Community to enact
environmental legislation," subsequent treaties have redefined the scope of
76. Bothe, supra note 18, at 251-52 ("The political debate on economic instruments in
Europe, and corresponding legislative developments, have taken place both at the level of the
European Community and at that of the Member States.") (footnote omitted). Bothe stated:
"Economic instruments... involve questions of both national and Community law. Community
law may, and to a certain extent does, limit national choices concerning those instruments." Id.
at253.
77. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 221. Nevertheless, the Heads of State
or government decided, at the 1972 Paris Summit, that the Community should develop an
environmental policy program. Id. at 221-22. Although the Treaty of Rome did not explicitly
authorize the Community to enact environmental legislation, it included two provisions that
were frequently used as the basis for environmental laws prior to the adoption of the Single
European Act in 1987, which explicitly addresses environmental law. See id. at 221 n. 7
("Article 2 did refer to 'quality of life' issues and Article 36 allowed for the4 'continuation or
banning or restriction of the trade for reasons of public health, protection of animals and
plants.'"). Article 308 of the Treaty of Rome (ex Article 235) authorizes Community action if
"necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives
of the Community and [the Treaty of Rome] has not provided the necessary powers." CoNSOLI-
DATED EU TERATiES, supra note 18, art. 308. It was widely used as a basis for environmental
legislation. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 222 n.12 (commenting on grant of
power by former article 235, allowing European community to attain objectives where Treaty
of Rome had not provided necessary powers). However, legislation under Article 308 must be
adopted unanimously. See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 308. The other
provision of the Treaty of Rome that was often used as the basis for environmental legislation
was Article 94 (ex Article 100), which authorizes the adoption of directives for the approxima-
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the Community's power,7" and the European Union79 now plays a central role
in creating and influencing Europe's environmental legislative framework.8"
The lawmaking bodies of the European Union8' have adopted more than three
tion (harmonization) of national laws directly affecting the establishment or operation of the
Common Market. Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 222 n.12; CONSOLIDATED EU
TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 94. Like Article 308, though, Article 94 requires unanimous
adoption of the legislative measures. CONSOLiDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art 94.
Subsequently, Article 95 (exArticle 100A) amended the Treaty to provide for qualified majority
voting in some cases. Id. art 95.
78. The Single EuropeanAct (SEA), in 1987, and the Treaty on European Union, in 1992,
added several provisions that explicitly address environmental law. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana,
supra note 14, at 222 (discussing expansion of scope of environmental policymaking authority).
Article 174 (ex Article 130r) authorizes the lawmaking bodies of the European Union to adopt
environmental legislation, and Article 174(2) requires the European Union to consider environ-
mental protection in all of its policies and actions. See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra
note 18, art. 174; see also Brinkhorst, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing impact of Single European
Act of 1987, Treaty of Maastricht, and new Treaty of Amsterdam in increasing prominence of
environmental issues). Although the Single European Act required unanimous approval of
environmental legislation or international environmental actions, the Treaty on European Union
(The Maastricht Treaty) amended the Treaty, so that it now provides that qualified majority
voting is sufficient for most environmental action, other than environmental taxes, land use
planning, water resources, and energy supplies, which require unanimous approval. CoNsoLi-
DATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 175.
79. Since the Maastricht Treaty, which strives to create an economic and monetary union
in Europe, the European Economic Community has been referred to as the European Union,
rather than the European Community. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Title I, art A, 1992
O.. (C 224) 1 (establishing "a European Union").
80. Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 219.
81. The Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament
are the lawmaking bodies ofthe European Union. The legislative process normally begins when
the Commission drafts a legislative proposal. See CONSOLDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18,
art. 251 (outlining procedure for legislative enactment). There are twenty Commissioners
who are appointed by the Member States for four year terms, but are not supposed to act as
representatives of their States. Id. art. 213. Each Commissioner supervises at least one
Directorate-General (department) of the Commission, which has specific administrative,
legislative and law enforcement duties. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 225
(explaining structure of European Commission and responsibilities of Commissioners). For
instance, Directorate General XI is the Environment and Nuclear Safety Directorate. Id.
Although the Commission drafts legislation, it does not adopt it. Instead, the Council of
Ministers adopts legislation. See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 202
(delineating each body's sphere of action). The Council of Ministers consists of representatives
of the governments of the Member States, and the representatives vary depending upon the topic
of the legislation that is being considered. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 223
(describing distribution of Council of Minister's duties into policy areas). For instance, a
country's Environment Minister, or her representative, might sit on the Council of Ministers
when the Council is considering environmental legislation. The Council cannot draft legislation
itself, but it can request the Commission to draft legislation, and it can amend legislative
proposals. Id. at 223-24 n.18.
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hundred environmental laws over the past three decades."
Generally, the European Union adopts legislation either in the form of a
directive or a regulation.83 A directive establishes policy for the European
Union, but the provisions of the directive are not applicable and enforceable
in a Member State until that State implements the provisions through a statute,
constitutional amendment, presidential decree, administrative act, or other
measure that is appropriate to the particular State. 4 Directives are "binding,
as to the result to be achieved,... [but] leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods.""5 While directives provide States with discre-
tion regarding the appropriate implementation mechanisms, they do not pro-
vide States with discretion regarding the timing of implementation, and most
directives require that the states implement them within a specified time
frame. 6 Most environmental law in the European Union is adopted through
directives. On the other hand, regulation are binding on and directly applica-
ble to the Member States without additional legislative or executive action in
the Member State."
To the extent that legislation in a Member State conflicts with legislation
of the European Union (EU), EU law is supreme, and the Member State has
a duty to amend or repeal its law.88 While Member States cannot enact or
enforce laws that conflict with EU legislation, they can adopt environmental
The final "lawmaking" body, the European Parliament, has limited "lawmaking" power,
but plays a strong consultative role. See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 251
(describing European Parliament's advisory capacity). The Parliament has a right to be con-
sulted and to provide an opinion on legislative proposals and, in limited circumstances, it may
propose amendments to legislation and it may veto legislative provisions. Id.
82. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 222 (noting 300 pieces of environmental
legislation); Francois Jarvis & Ann Sherlock, The European Convention on Human Rights and
the Environment, 24 EUR. L. REV. 15,24 (1999) (commenting on large volume of environmen-
tal directives).
83. The lawmaking bodies of the European Union may also take various non-legislative
acts, including declarations, resolutions, notices, policy statements, recommendations, opinions
and individual decisions. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 232 (relating various
mechanisms for implementing policy). While most of these measures are non-binding, a
Council decision is directly binding on the Member States or parties to which it is addressed.
Id. (citing Article 189 of Treaty of Rome).
84. See CONSOUDATED EU TREATIS, supra note 18, art. 249 (leaving implementation
of directives to national authorities).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Council Directive 97/11, art. 3, 1997 O.J. (L 73) 5 (providing compliance
timeline); Council Directive 96/61, art. 21, 1996 O.J. (L 257) 26 (same).
87. CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 249.
88. See James Flynn, Litigation in Europe, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN EUROPE, supra
note 14, at 19, 29 (discussing concept of "primacy" requiring national law to give way to EU
law).
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laws that are more stringent or protective than the EU legislation, as long as
they are compatible with the Treaty. 9
Member States play an important role in the implementation of European
Union environmental policy because the Treaties of the European Union ex-
plicitly require States to implement and enforce EU law.' Consequently, the
courts of Member States generally implement and enforce EU environmental
policies, rather than the institutions of the Union.9" As might be expected, the
level of commitment to implementation and enforcement of EU environmental
laws and policies in the Member States varies greatly.' While some countries
adopt stringent environmental laws and aggressively enforce EU requirements,
other countries adopt modest environmental laws and enforce the EU require-
ments sporadicallyto attractbusinesses that would preferto avoidthe high costs
of environmental compliance.93 With this brief background, it is appropriate to
return to the discussion of the specific economic environmental protection
measures that the European Union and its Member States are implementing.
B. Environmental Taxes and Deposit Refund Systems
One of the primary economic measures that European countries employ
to address environmental problems is the environmental tax. The contribution
of environmental taxes to the total tax revenue in European countries is
steadily increasing, and countries are targeting a broader range of products
and activities for taxation.94
The United States' experience with environmental taxes has been more
modest. The federal government has pollution taxes to phase out the produc-
tion of various chlorofluorocarbons and to encourage the manufacture of fuel-
efficient cars, and many states impose fees on the sale of tires or fertilizers.95
However, thus far, the federal government and states do not rely heavily on
environmental taxes to address environmental problems.96
89. See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 176.
90. Id. arts. 10, 175(4).
91. See Christopher M.G. Himsworth, Things FallApart" The Harmonisation of Com-
munity JudicialProceduralProtection Revisited, 22 EIR. L. REV. 291,294 (1997) (critiquing
potential for lack of uniformity and calling for procedural rules or case by case supervision).
92. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 220 (discussing different levels of com-
mitment to environmental policy among Member States).
93. See infra notes 351-53 and accompanying text.
94. See EEA TaxReport, supra note 23, at 1, 2 (addressing rise in use of environmental
taxes).
95. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 137-38 (explaining federal and state tax measures
designed to reduce pollution).
96. See id. at 136 (noting federal and state government reluctance to use pollution taxes,
fees, and charges).
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The taxes implemented in Europe include emissions charges and product
charges. For instance, France, Germany, and several other countries impose
taxes on the discharge of wastewater or other water pollutants. 7 Nine coun-
tries in the European Union impose waste disposal taxes.' Sweden imposes
taxes on emissions of air pollutants, such as NOX. 9 Recently, the United King-
dom reformed its vehicle excise tax to require persons who buy larger, more
heavily polluting vehicles to pay a higher tax than persons who buy smaller
cars.'" Countries also tax batteries, packaging, and tires to encourage more
responsible consumption of those products and management of their waste.
Many countries also are exploring new tax bases, such as fertilizers, pesti-
cides, chemicals, groundwater, and tourism."
The strongest use of environmental taxes in Europe, though, is in the
energy and transport sectors. Almost 95% of the environmental tax revenue
in Europe comes from energy and transportation taxes.'O' By next year, most
of the European Union countries will apply carbon taxes ." Fuel taxes are
also employed in several European countries."
There are several reasons why European countries have chosen to
implement environmental taxes. As noted previously, some of the rationale
for adopting such taxes relates to the necessity of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions to meet the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol, and to the neces-
sity of finding new sources of stable tax revenue, as businesses and trade
move more freely from one country to another in the global and electronic
marketplace.' Environmental taxes provide several fundamental benefits
that make them attractive tools to achieve those goals. First, they create
economic incentives for persons or businesses to reduce the pollution that
97. See Bothe, supra note 18, at 253 (isting nations with water pollution taxes); EEA Tax
Report, supra note 23, at 4 (same).
98. See Bothe, supra note 18, at 253; EEA Tax Report, supra note 23, at 1-2 (noting
increase use of waste disposal taxes).
99. See Bothe, supra note 18, at 253; EEA Tax Report, supra note 23, at 4 (addressing
effectiveness of environmental taxes such as those used in Sweden).
100. See Market-BasedApproachesAre Being Used in Europe toAddress Environmental
Concerns, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1531 (July 21, 2000) (observing change in vehicle excise
duty).





105. Id. at 4; see also Bothe, supra note 18, at 253.
106. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (explaining practical justifications for
economic measures).
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they generate or reduce their use of resources, in order to reduce their tax
burden."x° Second, they create a revenue source that governments can use to
address the underlying environmental problems."° Third, they play an
important role in shaping social norms by sending a signal that discourages
certain activities that are environmentally harmful and should be discour-
aged." Finally, in some respects, there is a sense of fairness to environmen-
tal taxes, in that the polluter (for polluting activities), or the user of a pollut-
ing product, is forced to pay for the actual environmental costs of their actions
or consumption choices.
In studies evaluating the effectiveness of environmental taxes, research-
ers generally have concluded that the taxes are achieving those goals. Evalua-
tions of the French and German water pollution taxes, the Swedish NO,
charge, the Danish waste tax, the Finnish and Swedish CO2 taxes, the Danish
tax on sulphur in fuel, the tax differentiation between leaded and unleaded
petrol, and the "fuel duty escalator" in the United Kingdom have demonstrated
positive environmental results.110
While the countries in the European Union have adopted many types of
environmental taxes, the European Union itself has not enacted any legislation
that imposes environmental taxes, although it currently is considering a pro-
posal to institute a CO2 tax to reduce greenhouse gas emissions."' There are
two major reasons why the Union has not adopted any environmental taxes,
both of which relate to the structure of the Union. First, while the European
Union can adopt many forms of legislation through qualified majority voting,
fiscal measures must be adopted through unanimous approval.1 Not surpris-
ingly, it has been difficult to get the fifteen Member States to agree to impose
a "European" tax on their citizens. Second, even if the Member States could
agree that it was necessary to implement a European-wide environmental tax,
it would be difficult to structure the tax because the tax systems of the Mem-
107. See EEA Tax Repor4 supra note 23, at 1-2, 4 (noting financial benefits of environ-
mentally-friendly behavior).
108. See id. at 2, 4 (noting rise in revenue from environmental taxes).
109. See id. at 4 (arguing that environmental taxes increase attention to environmental
issues).
110. Id.; see also SUNSTIN, supra note 30, at 331 (noting that differential tax structure for
unleaded gasoline in Britain increased its market share from four percent to thirty percent in less
than one year).
111. See Kenneth A. Armstrong, Governance and the Single European Market, in THE
EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 745, 773 (Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca ed., 1999) (remarking on
"long life" of carbon tax proposal); Bothe, supra note 18, at 254 (outlining debate over
greenhouse gas reduction proposal).
112. CONSOLiDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 175; see also EEA Tax Report,
supra note 23, at 3 (noting unanimity requirement).
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV 417 (2001)
ber States have not been "harmonized.' ' 13 An environmental tax would be
acceptable politically to most countries only if it were fiscally neutral, so that
increases in environmental taxes were offset by decreases in other areas of
taxation." 4 It would be practically impossible, due to the different structure
of taxes in the Member States, to create an environmental tax that would be
"fiscally neutral" in all the Member States."'
In addition to the obstacles to Europe-wide environmental taxes, there are
impediments to further imposition of environmental taxes by the Member
States. First, because the countries are part of an economic union, they have
accepted some limits on their taxing powers under the Treaties. Emission
charges and product charges must be structured so that they do not discrimi-
nate against products or companies from other countries and so that they do
not conflict with European Union law or otherwise interfere with the free
trade requirements of the European Union." 6 Similarly, in an open market,
countries are reluctant to impose taxes that may weaken their competitiveness
in the market." 7 Principles of fiscal neutrality also provide obstacles to the
introduction of taxes in Member States, as in the European Union."' It is
often difficult to offset a proposed environmental tax with a reduction in
another tax in a manner that is politically acceptable." 9 Finally, in some
countries, public opposition to environmental taxes has grown when the gov-
emnment did not use the taxes to achieve environmental objectives.120 This
makes it difficult to adopt new environmental taxes in those countries.
113. See Bothe, supra note 18, at 252 (explaining difficulty in imposing multi-national
environmental taxes).
114. See id. (addressing impact of environmental taxes on general tax burden).
115. Id.
116. See id. at 253-54 (relating limits on national tax systems imposed by Community
membership).
117. See EEA Tax Report, supra note 23, at 7 (observing concerns over effects of environ-
mental taxes on individual Member States).
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id. at 4,7.
120. For instance, the United Kingdom has instituted a gradually escalating tax on petrol
to encourage consumers to reduce their consumption, and taxes account for about three quarters
of the price of petrol in the United Kingdom. When truck drivers blockaded refineries in Britain
recently to protest the high cost of petrol, there was very little discussion of the environmental
goals of the tax. As the London Times reported shortly after the "crisis":
The current fuel tax might be easier to bear if the money raised were to be pledged
to improvements in the public transport infrastructure, but it is not. Too often, duty
has been piled on petrol because motorists are a captive source of revenue. In the
1995 mini-budget, it was perfectly obvious that the 16p slapped on a gallon of
petrol was designed to raise the revenue for a penny cut in the income tax.
Janet Bush, Duty-Bound toRethinkEnvronmentalIssue, LONDON TIMES, Sept. 18,2000, at 23.
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While there are some impediments to the expansion of environmental
taxes in the-European Union, taxes remain an important tool in the European
arsenal of environmental protection measures. However, environmental taxes
can have important negative impacts for environmental justice. Most signifi-
cantly, pollution taxes could have regressive effects on low income popula-
tions.,21 For instance, low-income households would feel the impacts of an
energy tax much more keenly than high-income households, because low-
income households spend a greater proportion oftheir income on heat, electric-
ity, and gasoline than high-income households.' Similarly, a tax on fertilizers
and pesticides will have a much greater impact on a small family farmer than
on a major agribusiness. Since European countries tax a greater variety of
products and activities to achieve environmental benefits, there are greater
opportunities for regressive impacts in Europe than in the United States.
However, the regressive effect is addressable in several ways. For in-
stance, with regard to the energy tax, instead of imposing a flat tax on the use
of energy, the government could impose a progressive tax on the end users,
so that smaller users would pay taxes at a lower rate, or the government could
exempt certain users from the tax." Nations also could provide energy sub-
sidies to low-income populations to reduce the impacts of the tax. 24 Further-
more, other complementary measures could be instituted,'" such as measures
to improve the energy-efficiency of low-income housing. To some extent
European governments are implementing this approach through the concept
of fiscal neutrality. 2  However, in some cases, the taxes that are reduced to
offset the environmental taxes do not remedy the regressive impacts of the tax
and are wholly unrelated to the tax itself.127 In those cases, the tax clearly has
a redistributive impact.
121. See Bothe, supra note 18, at 256 (commenting on potential disparate impact of pollu-
tion taxes); Johnson, supra note 21, at 139 (same); Rowe, supra note 26, at 70 (same).
122. Johnson, supra note 21, at 139.
123. See id. (proposing measures to reduce burdens on low-income energy users); see also
EE4 TaxRepor4 supra note 23, at 8.
124. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 139 (suggesting measures to ameliorate disparate
impact); Rowe, supra note 26, at 65-66.
125. EEA Tax Repor supra note 23, at 8.
126. See id. at 5, 7 (stating that majority of Member States implemented environmental
taxes as part of wider fiscal reform); see also Bothe, supra note 18, at 256 (noting that Nether-
lands and Scandinavian countries are using fuelfenergy tax approach).
127. See Bothe, supra note 18, at 254-56;Market-BasedApproachesAre Being Used in
Europe to Address Environmental Concerns, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1531 (July 21, 2000)
(noting that increase in taxes on fuel and heating oil were accompanied by decrease on require-
ments for insurance contributions). Such reductions may increase the political likelihood that
a tax will be adopted, but do not redress the redistributive impacts of the tax.
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C. Pollutant Trading Systems
Another economic measure that is beginning to become popular in Euro-
pean countries is the pollutant trading system,'2 although it is not nearly as
popular in Europe as it is in the United States.29 The European Union has
never implemented trading programs for pollutants,130 although it has utilized
quotas and transferable rights in the Union's Common Fisheries Policy, Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, and its program for reducing ozone depleting sub-
stances under the Montreal Protocol."' However, many of the countries
within the European Union have enacted legislation 32 or are developing
programs to implement trading programs for various pollutants. 33 As in the
United States, the trading programs are designed to complement, rather than
replace, traditional command and control regulatory approaches and other
economic measures. 34
128. In trading programs, entities are allocated the right to emit a specific amount of
pollution. If they emit less than that amount, they can sell their surplus "rights" to others who
cannot meet their limits. Since the total amount of pollution "rights" is fixed, a minimum level
of environmental protection is assured. At the same time, though, the environment is protected
in a cost-effective manner, and entities have an incentive to develop technologies that reduce
pollution emissions. See Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Within the Eur-
opean Union COM(2000)87 at 4 (discussing emissions trading) [hereinafter Greenhouse Gas
Green Paper].
129. Federal, state, and local governments in the United States have utilized pollutant
trading programs to address sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide,
lead, ozone, chlorofluorocarbons, halons, and various water pollutants. See Johnson, supra note
21, at 125-29 (describing United States federal and state emissions trading programs).
130. See Bothe, supra note 18, at 254 (stating that "there is practically no experience in
Europe concerning tradeable permits").
131. Greenhouse Gas Green Paper, supra note 128, at 8.
132. Denmark recently enacted legislation that establishes a carbon dioxide trading
program for electric utilities, beginning next year. Id. at 11. The United Kingdom also has the
authority to establish trading programs for greenhouse gases and other pollutants. Section 3 of
the U.K.'s Environmental Protection Act 1990 authorizes the Secretary of State to establish total
emissions of a substance either nationally, or for a limited geographic area, and to allocate
quotas for those emissions, and progressively reduce the total permitted emissions. Redgwell,
supra note 18, at 261-62. Despite the statutory authorization, the United Kingdom has not yet
established any pollutant trading programs. Id.
133. See Greenhouse Gas Green Paper, supra note 128, at 11, 15 (stating that "several
other Member States are actively considering the use of domestic emissions trading"). The
German government is developing a plan for a carbon dioxide trading program, which it hopes
to launch between 2003 and 2005, after a limited test of the program in 2001-2002. Verena
Schmitt-Roschmann, Germany to Work on Emission Trading Plan with Help from Indusry,
StockExchange, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1565 (July 28, 2000); see also Bothe, supra note 18, at
254 (noting that different Member States have put forward several emissions trading proposals).
134. See Greenhouse Gas Green Paper, supra note 128, at 6, 21, 23-24 (discussing
importance of emissions trading being compatible with other policies).
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In addition to these initiatives by individual Member States, the European
Union is earnestly pursuing the establishment of a Europe-wide pollutant
trading program to reduce the Union's emissions of greenhouse gases.13
Without a trading program, it is unlikely that the Union will be able to achieve
the ambitious reductions that are required by the Kyoto Protocol.'36 Although
the European Union could rely on separate trading programs within the
Member States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, proponents ofthe Europe-
wide program argue that a uniform program would: (1) ensure a single price
for allowances traded within Europe; 37 (2) reduce the potential for Member
States to erect barriers to trade and commerce throughthe allocation or admin-
istration of individual programs within the States; 38 and (3) reduce the admin-
istrative costs of trading programs for the States' 39
Since international greenhouse gas trading under the Treaty will begin
in 2008,14° the European Union is attempting to institute a European trading
program by 2005."l Initially, the Europe-wide trading program would focus
solely on large fixed point sources of carbon dioxide emissions." 2
135. Id. at4.
136. Id. Under the Kyoto Protocol, between 2008-2012, the European Union must reduce
its emissions of greenhouse gases to a level that is 8% less than their 1990 emissions. In prac-
tice, the reductions amount to 14% reductions below "business as usual" levels. Id.
137. Id.
138. As the European Commission's Green Paper notes,
[t]he objective of the principle of freedom of establishment, under Article 43 and
48 of the EC Treaty ... is to confer on companies or firms formed in accordance
with the law of a Member State, the right to set up their principle establishment in
another Member State or to create agencies, branches or subsidiaries in other
member States.
Id. at 7. If each State established its own trading program, States might interfere with the single
market of the European Union by exempting particular industries or entities from the require-
ments of the program, limiting the distribution of new pollution "rights" (and therefore, limiting
market entry), or assisting domestic companies in obtaining pollution "rights." Id. at 5.
139. Id. at4.
140. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 22, art. 17; see also Greenhouse Gas Green Paper, supra
note 128, at 6.
141. Greenhouse Gas Green Paper, supra note 128, at 4. The European Commission's
Green Paper describes the benefits of a 2005 launch as follows: "There would be considerable
benefits in terms of 'learning-by-doing' that would ensure that the Community was better pre-
pared for the start of international emissions trading from 2008 under the Kyoto Protocol. Such
experience would give Community actors practical familiarity, and even a leading edge, in using
the instrument" Id. at 10.
142. Id. at 10-11. Carbon dioxide emissions constitute approximately 80% of the Euro-
pean Union's greenhouse gas emissions, and the sources identified as targets for initial partici-
pation in the European Commission's Green Paper account for 45% of carbon dioxide green-
house gas emissions in the European Union. Id. at 10-11, 13. Although the trading program
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Although the European Union and its Member States gradually are adopt-
ing pollutant trading programs, it is not clear that they are adequately consider-
ing or addressing the potential disparate impacts that such programs can create.
There are several ways that pollutant trading programs can disparately impact
particular communities or socioeconomic groups. First, the initial allocation
ofpollution "rights" can have disparate impacts.1 43 For instance, if"rights" are
allocated in proportion to historic emission levels, heavy polluters receive more
"rights." Similarly, if "rights" are allocated through a system that gradually
phases out new "rights," existing polluters receive an advantage over new
polluters. Because heavily polluting industries tend to be located in lower
income communities,'" rights allocation systems that advantage existing heavy
polluters can disadvantage lower income communities. The allocation of the
rights does not just perpetuate the pre-existing inequities, but, rather, exacer-
bates and institutionalizes them. As noted earlier, due to the "endowment
effect," persons who are granted legally protected "rights" by the government
tend to demand more compensation to surrender those rights than they would
offer to obtain those rights. 4 ' Thus, the heavy polluters are likely to be reluc-
tant to reduce their pollution emissions in response to demands from local
communities.146 In addition, those communities often lack the political or
financial resources to encourage the polluters to reduce their emissions.147
The structure of the European Union and its guarantees of free trade and
a single market may, however, limit the disparate impact of the allocation of
allowances to some extent. While emission rights in the Europe-wide green-
house gas trading program may be allocated based on historical emissions,'48
would focus initially on a limited universe of sources and a single pollutant, the Commission's
Green Paper stresses that the system should be designed so that it could be expanded gradually
to cover all of the greenhouse gases and a wider universe of sources. Id. at 10.
143. See Rowe, supra note 26, at 70 (discussing equity concerns that arise with allocation
of permits). Pollutant trading programs are different from traditional permitting or licensing
programs in that traditional programs normally do not limit the number of permits that the gov-
ernment can issue. Id.
144. The nexus between heavily polluting industries and low income communities is clear
in the United States, see Johnson, supra note 21, at 130-31, and it is being established gradually
in Europe as well. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
146. Id.
147. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 131 (stating that "low-income communities often lack
the political power to influence industries to adopt new pollution controls instead of buying
pollution rights").
148. The European Union has not yet determined the method that will be used to allocate
allowances among individual companies. See Greenhouse Gas Green Paper, supra note 128,
at 9 ("The 6th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC may or may not specifically address
the question of 'entity' involvement in emissions trading."). When the Europemwide greenhouse
gas trading program is established, the European Union and its Member States will have to
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it is unlikely that the program will phase out the allocation of new "rights"
over time.'49 A program that phased out the allocation of "rights" in Member
States could prevent companies from relocating from one State to another and
could, therefore, interfere with the freedom of establishment guarantees of the
European Union Treaties. 5
Although the structure of the Union may limit the disparate impact of
trading in one respect, it could increase the potential disparate impacts of
trading in another way. While pollutant trading programs promise to maintain
or reduce overall pollution levels in a "cost-effective" way, they may often
increase pollution levels in certain areas and create toxic hot spots, as older,
heavily polluting industries find that it is more cost-effective to pollute than
to reduce emissions.'5 ' Because those older, heavily polluting industries are
decide how to allocate allowances among Member States, among industrial sectors, and among
individual companies. Id. Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol requires the European Union, as a
whole, to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases by 8% from 1990 levels in 2008 through
2012, but it allows the Member States flexibility to decide that some countries must reduce their
emissions more than others. Id. While the Member States will determine, through negotiation,
the appropriate allocation of allowances among the States, the European Union, rather than the
Member States, must determine how the allowances will be allocated among industrial sectors.
The decision cannot be left to Member States because some States
may be tempted to exempt particular sectors from making any contribution... or set
unchallenging sectoral targets. This could give rise to complaints from competing
companies in other Member States. According to Community law, such concerns
could fall under existing state aid and internal market provisions because they
essentially concern potentially distortionary aid to particular sectors or companies.
Id. at 17-18.
149. Id. at 18-19.
150. The Commission's Green Paper notes that
[t]here are basically two ways to allocate: auctioning and allocation free of
charge .... Periodic auctioning is technically preferable, as it would give an equal
and fair chance to all companies to acquire the allowances they want in a transpar-
ent manner .... Auctioning avoids the need to take the difficult and politically
delicate decisions about how much to give each company covered by the trading
scheme. The complex issues raised above about state aid and competition would
largely disappear. It would also guarantee fair terms for new entrants to join the
system as they, like existing sources, would also have the same opportunity to buy
the allowances that they needed.... The case of new entrants warrants special
mention because, in the case of allowances being "grandfathered," companies that
were not given allowances free at the outset should still be able to obtain them
easily when they enter the market. For that reason, Member States should ensure
that allowances are available for new entrants, which may be "foreign" companies
wishing to enter the market, on equal terms.
Id.
151. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 129. The theory that trading programs will exacerbate
toxic "hot spots" was challenged recently in a study of the Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide trading
program. See Byron Swift,Allowance Trading and SO2 Hot Spots- Good News From theAcid
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often sited in lower income communities, those communities are disparately
impacted by the trading program."5 2 Although geographic limits on trading
could reduce the potential volume of pollution in a toxic hot spot, 5 3 there are
no plans, at present, to limit the geographic reach of trading in the Europe-
wide greenhouse gas trading program. Indeed, such limits on trades could be
seen as interfering with free trade and the single European market under the
European Union Treaties.'54
D. Voluntary Agreements
In addition to taxes and trading programs, European countries rely on
voluntary agreements as economic environmental protection measures. Volun-
tary agreements are similar to regulatory waiver and variance programs like the
Common Sense Initiative55 and Project XL 5" in the United States, in that they
Rain Program, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 954 (May 12,2000). The author of the study concluded
that the effects of sulfur dioxide trading have been minimal in regards to hot spots, and likely
even positive. Id. He determined that "[o]n a regional level, no significant trends can be
discerned in the flow of traded allowances ... ." Id. However, his conclusion was based, in
part, on his finding that 81% of allowances that were used to offset emissions came from the
same state as the emitting source. Id. at 957. While that might suggest that it is less likely that
hot spots are being created in one State as a result of pollution trades with another State, it does
not rule out the possibility that hot spots are being created in a State due to trades within the
State. Similarly, the researcher concluded that "net interregional trades of allowances constitute
only 3 per cent of all allowances used." Id. at 954. Once again, though, this would merely
suggest that hot spots are not being caused by trades from outside of the region. It does not
reduce the likelihood that hot spots are being caused by trading within a region.
Finally, though, the author concluded that "the data shows that the plants with the largest
emissions have cleaned up the most" and that trading programs "create incentives for the dirtiest
plants to clean up the most, as the per-ton cost of emissions reductions may be expected to be the
least." Id. at 957. To the extent that trading programs create incentives for the heaviest polluters
to reduce their discharges, and to the extent that the heaviest polluters are located in low income
communities, trading programs could have some beneficial effects for environmental justice.
152. Johnson, supra note 21, at 129.
153. Id.
154. The Treaty of Rome prohibits bans on imports or exports of goods, and measures that
have the equivalent effect See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, arts. 28, 29. It is
conceivable that those provisions could be interpreted to prohibit limits on the sale of pollution
rights.
155. Through the Common Sense Initiative, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency met with representatives of the automobile, computer, iron and steel, printing, metal
finishing, and petroleum refining industries, to identify, through consensus, new environmental
protection strategies for the industries, and changes to existing laws that would be necessary to
enable the industries to protect the environment in more efficient ways. See United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Common Sense Initiative: An Industry Sector Approach to
Protecting the Environment, at http'/www.epa.gov/ooaujeaglcsi/bckgrd.html (last visited Feb.
6,2001).
156. Project XL is a national pilot program that allows state and local governments,
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are tools by which the government circumvents the normal law-making process
to develop environmental protection requirements. Voluntary agreements are,
as their name suggests, voluntary commitments by industry sectors or associa-
tions to comply with environmental protection requirements that the govern-
ment and the industry sectors or associations established through negotia-
tion.l"7 The goal ofthe parties is to develop requirements that enable industry
to meet environmental protection standards in a cost-effective manner, 5 ' and
the agreements complement, rather than replace, other regulatory and eco-
nomic approaches.5 9 While the agreements produce environmental benefits
and have been widely implemented,' 6° the European Environment Agency
suggests that they are most suitable for proactive industrial sectors, with a
small number of firms, addressing environmental problems of limited scale. 6
While the European Union has not negotiated anyvoluntary agreements,' 62
several years ago, the European Commission issued a communication support-
business and federal facilities to develop with the EPA "innovative strategies to test bettor or
more cost effective ways of achieving environmental and public health protection" as well as
to produce "superior environmental results" beyond those that would be achieved under current
and reasonably anticipated future regulations or policies. See United States Environmental
Protection Agency, What is Project XL?, at http'//www.epa.gov/ProjctXL/file2.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2001). In exchange, the EPA issues regulatory, program, policy, or procedural
flexibility to conduct the experiment Id.
157. See European Environment Agency, Environmental Agreements: Environmental
Effectiveness, in ENvIRoNMENTAL ISSUES, series no. 3, Exec. Summ. (1997), at http'/themes.
eea.eu.int/showpage.php/policy?pg=39279 (last visited Feb. 6, 2001) [hereinafter EEA EA
Paper]. Depending on the intentions of the parties, voluntary agreements could merely estab-
lish voluntary codes of conduct or they could create legally binding standards. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. The European Environment Agency recently conducted a case study of environmental
agreements and concluded that "generally, there have been environmental improvements since
the EAs were signed .... " Id.
161. Id. In addition, the agency suggested that implementation of the agreements is more
effective when
clear targets are set prior to the agreement; the agreement specifies the baseline
against which improvements will be measured; the agreement specifies reliable and
clear monitoring and reporting mechanisms; technical solutions are available in
order to reach the agreed target; the costs of complying with the EA are limited and
are relatively similar for all members of the target group; third parties are involved
in the design and application of EAs.
Id.
162. Id. However, the Commission is currently discussing non-binding agreements with
industries to phase out CFCs and to reduce C02 emissions. Id. While the Commission does
not have any authority to enter into legally binding agreements, it can negotiate with industries
to establish unilateral commitments to comply with specific requirements. See Greenhouse Gas
Green Paper, supra note 128, at 21 (recognizing potential of "voluntary initiatives by and
environmental agreements with industry").
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ing their use by Member States and establishing guidelines for agreements. 63
Furthermore, the use ofvoluntary agreements is consistent with the goals ofthe
Union's Fifth Environmental Action Program.'" Member States entered into
more than 300 agreements with industrial sectors, firms and associations by the
mid-1990s, and the use of voluntary agreements continues to flourish.161 The
United Kingdom's experience is typical of many of the EU Member States.
The United Kingdom has used voluntary agreements to protect and conserve
natural or historic sites since 1949.16 Since the 1970s, however, the United
Kingdom has expanded its focus by entering into agreements relating to the
storage andtransport ofpesticides, the banning of certain substances in washing
products, the emission of hydroflourocarbons,
67 and energy consumption. 68
Furthermore, the agreements have been used in some cases to modify or waive
existing standards for a polluter to respond to local or unique factors. 69
Although voluntary agreements can achieve environmental benefits in a
cost-effective manner, they also can contribute to environmental injustice.
Voluntary agreements generally are negotiated without public participation,
163. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment on Environmental Agreements, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 96) 561 (1996) (advocating
broadening range of policy instruments) [hereinafter Commission Communication on Environ-
mentalAgreements]. The Commission stated that "[e]nvironmental agreements with industry
have an important role to play within the mix of policy instruments sought by the Com-
mission . . . . They can offer cost-effective solutions when implementing environmental
objectives and can bring about effective measures in advance of and in supplement to legisla-
tion." Id. at 22.
164. EFA EA Paper, supra note 157. As the European Environment Agency notes,
[t]he ... Fifth Environmental Action Program... is seen as part of the longer term
re-focusing of environmental policy in EU Member States and is aimed at integrat-
ing EU policy-making into a sustainable framework for economic and social
development. Towards this end, the [program] highlighted the need for a broaden-
ing of the range of policy instruments to complement the regulations, including...
voluntary environmental policy instruments.
Id.
165. Id. As of the mid-1990s, all of the EU Member States had entered into voluntary
agreements. Id. The Netherlands entered into over 100 agreements, and smaller countries, such
as Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden used the agreements far more often than larger
countries, such as France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Id.
166. See Rowan-Robinson & Ross, supra note 20, at 268 (discussing use of environmental
agreements).
167. Id. at 269.
168. See Redgwell, supra note 18, at 262 (relating use of voluntary agreements in United
Kingdom). In a recent agreement, the Chemicals Industry Association pledged to reduce energy
consumption by its members by 20% over 1990 amounts by 2005, and to provide annual
information to the government on energy consumption by its members. Id. In return, the
government pledged to provide audits and consulting advice to small and medium sized
businesses that are members of the Chemicals Industry Association. Id.
169. See id. (noting preference for flexible instruments).
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or with limited public participation.' ° While the poor and the powerless often
can rely on popularly elected representatives and deliberative lawmaking
processes to protect, or at least address, their interests when laws are made in
the legislatures of the Member States of the European Union, no one, gener-
ally, is advocating their interests in the negotiations on voluntary agreements.
Limited opportunities for public participation and limited disclosure of
information to the public about the process and implementation of the agree-
ment 7" increase the likelihood that the process will be co-opted by special
interests, and that the public interest will be minimized." 2 Voluntary agree-
ments also are more difficult to monitor and enforce than traditional laws."
To their credit, the European Commission and European Environment
Agency, as well as agencies in the Member States, raise precisely these con-
cerns with regard to environmental agreements. The Commission's Communi-
cation on Environmental Agreements establishes guidelines for agreements,
which require the setting of quantified objectives, the monitoring of results,
periodic reporting, the verification of results, and provisions for access to
information.' The guidelines also emphasize the importance of involving
interested parties and the public in the development of agreements.'" 5 All of
those requirements are designed to improve the credibility of the agreements
and to establish greater transparency. The European EnvironmentAgency also
has stressed the need for greater transparency during the negotiations, as well
as reliable monitoring and reporting to ensure that parties implement the agree-
ment. ' 6 Nevertheless, in most Member States, there remain very few opportu-
nities for public participation inthe negotiation of a voluntary agreement, or for
access to information about an agreement during the negotiation process. 7'
170. See EEA EA Paper, supra note 157 (stating that if environmental agreements are to
be used more widely "it is necessary to improve their credibility and accountability");
Armstrong, supra note 111, at 778 (claiming that crucial question raised by development of
environmental interests "relates to the range of voices which might be heard in such a process
of self-regulation").
171. The European Environment Agency, in its case study of environmental agreements,
concluded that many of the agreements do not include monitoring or reporting requirements.
EEA EA Paper, supra note 157.
172. See Armstrong, supra note 111, at 778 (noting that environmentalists and Member
States are "anxious to ensure that a proliferation of agreements does not lead to the 'privatiza-
tion' of regulation or of regulatory capture of regulators").
173. See EEA EA Paper, supra note 157 (commenting that many agreements surveyed do
not include monitoring and reporting provisions); Armstrong, supra note 111, at 774 (stating
that environmentalists were fearful that voluntary instruments would "take the place of binding
legal requirements and become difficult to monitor and enforce").
174. Commission Communication on EnvironmentalAgreements, supra note 163, at 6-10.
175. Id.
176. See EEA EA Paper, supra note 157 (calling for setting clear targets).
177. For instance, none of the statutory provisions in the United Kingdom that authorize
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E. Cost Benefit Analysis
The heavy reliance on cost-benefit analysis in the European Union treaty
and legislation of Member States demonstrates the significance of economic
measures. The significance of economic measures as environmental protection
tools in Europe also is evident in the heavy reliance on cost-benefit analysis in
European Union Treaty and legislation, and the legislation of Member States.
For instance, Article 174(3) of the Treaty requires the Union, when taking
environmental actions to consider "the potential benefits and costs of action or
lack of action... [and] the economic and social development of the Commu-
nity as a whole and the balanced development of its regions."0
78
Consequently, many of the environmental Directives of the European
Union explicitly include cost-benefit analysis requirements. The Integrated
Pollution Prevention and Control Directive (IPPC Directive) is one example.1 79
The legislation directs Member States to establish programs to require indus-
trial facilities that are within industrial sectors listed in an Annex to the Direc-
tive '8 to obtain permits for emissions to land, air and water."' The permits
must include limits on pollution discharges that are based onthe use of the best
available technology.'82 Technologies are "available" if they have been "devel-
oped on a scale which allows implementation in the relevant industrial sector,
under economically and technically viable conditions, taking into consider-
the government to enter into voluntary agreements authorize the public to participate in the
negotiations. See Rowan-Robinson & Ross, supra note 20, at 270-71. Furthermore, none of
the provisions require the government to provide access to information about the negotiations
to the public during the negotiations. Id. at 270. Although there is nothing to prevent the
government from providing additional information, government agencies in the United King-
dom have not done so. Id. at 270-71. Generally, most of the provisions authorize the public
to obtain information about the agreement after it has been finalized. Id. at 270.
In contrast, though, the Netherlands recently involved interest groups and other parties
in negotiations with industries to successfully develop a voluntary agreement addressing waste
reduction and recycling. Id. at 274.
178. See CONSOLIDATED EU TRFEATIEs, supra note 18, art. 174(3). The Treaty also lists,
as one of the objectives of environmental policy in the European Union, "prudent and rational
utilization of natural resources." Id. art. 174(1).
179. Council Directive 96/61 EC, 1996 O.J. (L 257)26 [hereinafterLPPC Directive].
180. The industries regulated by the Directive include the following: the energy industry,
metal production and processing, mineral, chemical, waste management, pulp and paper produc-
tion, pretreatment and dyeing of textiles, treatment and processing of food products, and instal-
lations for surface treatment using organic solvents. Id. Annex L
181. New facilities must be permitted by November 1999, and existing facilities must be
permitted when they undergo a substantial change, or, within eight years after implementation
of the Directive, whichever is earlier. Id. art. 5(1). The IPPC permit is required even though
the facility may already have a permit under another program of the EU or a Member State. Id.
182. Id. art. 9(4). The permit must include limits for pollutants that are "likely to be
emitted from the concerned installation in significant quantities .... ." Id. art. 9(3).
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ation the costs and advantages .. .,."" In determining the Best Available
Technology (BAT), Member States are directed to consider 'fhe likely costs
and benefits of a measure and the principles of precaution and prevention."
84
BAT, generally, is not established on a Union-wide level 85 but is, rather,
established by Member States, 'taking into account... geographical location
and local environmental conditions ... 6 In short, the Directive gives
Member States broad discretion to set lower environmental standards if the
costs of more stringent standards outweigh the benefits of those standards.'7
The European Union's Air Pollution from Industrial Plants Directive'
and the Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) Directive89 also give Member
States broad latitude to consider costs in choosing appropriate levels of
environmental protection. The Air Pollution Directive requires States to
develop permit programs for air pollution sources, and mandates that the
sources implement "the best available technology not entailing excessive cost"
(BATNEEC).'" The Member States develop the BATNEEC standards.'91
183. Id. arL 2(11).
184. Id. Healy stated:
The precautionary principle is the term that is used to describe the important shift
in environmental law from a regime that required a showing of actual harm to
human health or the environment before a regulatory response could be pursued by
a regime that permits or requires a regulatory response when harm to human health
or the environment is threatened.
Michael P. Healy, England's Contaminated Lands Act of 1995: Perspectives on America's
Approach to HazardousSubstance Cleanups and EvolvingPrinciples ofInternationalLaw, 13
I. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 289,291 (1997). In many cases, application of cost-benefit
analysis would seem to require implementation of a more lenient standard than would be
required through application of the precautionary principle. Despite this apparent conundrum,
the Directive does not specify which principle takes precedence.
185. Although the standards are generally not set by the European Union, the Directive
provides that the Council of Ministers will set standards for certain installations and substances
for which "the need for Community action has been identified." SeeLPPC Directive, supra note
179, art. 18(1).
186. Id. art. 9(4).
187. See Rod Hunter &Koen MuylleEuropean CommunityEnvironmentalLaw: Environ-
mental Legislation, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10297, 10308 (1999) (discussing implementation of
BAT). As Hunter and Muylle noted, "a southern European country that is anxious to encourage
industrial development, and that has a relatively pristine environment, might rely on local
environmental conditions to justify coming up with a less rigorous interpretation of BAT." Id.
188. Council Directive 84/360 on the Combating of Air Pollution from Industrial Plants,
1984 O.J. (L 188)20 (1984) [hereinaftcrAir Pollution Directive].
189. Council Directive 99/13 on the Limitation of Emissions of Volatile Organic Com-
pounds Due to Use of Organic Solvents in Certain Activities and Installations, 1999 O.J. (L 85)
1 (1999) [hereinafter VOCDirective].
190. Air Pollution Directive, supra note 188, art 4.
191. Id.
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Unlike the IPPC Directive or the Air Pollution Directive, the VOC Directive
establishes stringent limits on VOC emissions for industries that are covered
by the Directive, instead of delegating the development of standards to the
Member States.192 However, the Directive authorizes Member States to
approve "alternative reduction schemes" for facilities in lieu of the stringent
limits established bythe Directive, placing few limits on the States' discretion
to approve those schemes.193
Cost-benefit analysis is also a central component of legislation in many
of the Member States, partly because many of the States implement the
European Union's Directives without imposing more stringent limits. The
strong focus on cost benefit analysis in Member State legislation is evident in
the environmental laws of the United Kingdom. The Environment Act 1995
requires the Environment Agency, before exercising any powers conferred on
it, to "take into account the likely costs and benefits of the exercise or non-
exercise of the power or its exercise in the manner in question."194 This theme
is carried through in many other pieces of United Kingdom environmental
law. The United Kingdom's Contaminated Land Act, 95 which regulates the
cleanup ofhazardous substances, includes several cost-benefit requirements. 96
First, unlike the Superfund law in the United States, which generally requires
liable persons to clean up property to a level that protects human health, the
Contaminated Lands Act merely requires liable persons to take reasonable
measures, based on a consideration of the costs and seriousness of the harm,
to clean up a release of hazardous substances."9 In addition, the Act allows
polluters to avoid or reduce their liability for the release of a hazardous sub-
stance based on financial hardship. 19' Another law, the United Kingdom's
Environmental Protection Act 1990, creates a permitting program for air pol-
lution sources and establishes pollution standards for the sources based on the
best available technology not entailing excessive cost."9
192. VOC Directive, supra note 189, Annex IL
193. See Hunter & Muylle, supra note 187, at 10312 (discussing scope of VOC legisla-
tion).
194. EnvironmentalAct of 1995, § 39(1) (Eng.); see also Jones, supra note 17, at 568,578
(describing provisions of Enviromnental Act of 1995).
195. Environmental Act of 1995, ch. 25, § 57 (Eng.) [hereinafter CLA].
196. The drafters of the legislation did not want to incorporate many of the provisions of
the United States' Superfund law, which they felt was too costly. See Healy, supra note 184,
at 289-90 (comparing CERCLA and CLA).
197. CLA, supra note 195, § 78H see also Healy, supra note 184, at 297-98 (discussing
provisions of CLA).
198. CIA, supra note 195, § 78Ph, see also Healy, supra note 184, at 304 (relating limita-
tions of liability under CIA).
199. See Jones, supra note 17, at 579-80.
ECONOMICS V EQUTY1: THE EUROPEANEXPERIENCE
Reliance on cost benefit analysis could disparately impact low income
communities in several ways. Under cost benefit analysis, as it is used most
often, the government takes a particular action if it determines that the net
benefits of the action exceed the net costs.2" This approach ignores the fact
that although society as a whole may benefit, particular groups in society may
suffer from the action2  Several features of cost benefit analysis increase the
likelihood that application of the analysis will disparately impact low income
communities and the poor. First, while the costs of government actions may
be readily determinable, the benefits of the action, such as the number and
value of lives saved and the decreased likelihood of cancer or other health
risks, are often difficult to quantify.2" In many cases, the value of a benefit
is calculated based on the willingness, or rather, ability, of the recipient to pay
for the benefit.0 3 Since the poor are less able to pay for benefits, the value of
benefits to them will be given less weight in cost benefit analysis.244 In addi-
tion, in many cases, the benefits of a government action will only become
apparent after careful study and opportunities for public involvement in the
study. °" To the extent that low income communities lack the resources to
participate in such studies, it is less likely that the decisionmaking process will
identify the benefits of a proposed action for low income residents.
V Safety Nets in the Market
It is obvious, from the discussion in Part IV of this Article, that the
economic environmental protection measures that are being implemented in
Europe could have disparate impacts on low income communities. However,
as noted in Part II, strong public participation requirements, information
disclosure requirements, financial and technical assistance programs, environ-
mental assessment and planning requirements, and broad access to courts for
citizens could empower communities and minimize the likelihood that the
measures will have disparate impacts. This Part of the Article examines the
limited extent to which these "safety nets" have been incorporated into Euro-
pean environmental law, and contrasts the greater reliance on these tools in
the United States.
200. See Rowe, supra note 26, at 73 (explaining public decision-making methodologies).
201. Id.
202. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 129. Sunstein suggested that the way to address this
limitation of cost benefit analysis is to undertake the analysis "in a way that is alert to problems
of quantification and that is sophisticated about methods for valuing variables that are hard to
quantify." Id. This is, perhaps, much easier said than done.
203. Id. at 129; see also Rowe, supra note 26, at 73.
204. See SUNSTIN, supra note 30, at 129 (noting bias against poor in cost-benefit analysis).
205. Id. at 138-39.
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A. Public Participation
Public participation in government decisionmaking is essential, not only
for purposes of environmental justice, but also for economic efficiency, as
broad public input reduces the information gathering burden on the govern-
ment and reduces the likelihood that the government will allocate resources
in an inefficient manner due to incomplete information.2  Accordingly,
economic environmental protection measures, as well as traditional regulatory
environmental laws, should include broad opportunities for public participa-
tion, and guarantees of balanced representation in government decisionmaking
processes.2 7
In the United States, citizens are guaranteed a role in most governmental
decisionmaking through the Administrative Procedures Act, which requires
government agencies, in most cases, to notify the public when they are plan-
ning to issue a regulation, issue a permit, or take other actions, and to hold a
hearing or provide other opportunities for citizens to participate in the
decisionmaking process, such as the submission of written comments.2ca
Many of the federal environmental laws impose additional procedural require-
ments on government, such as requirements for earlier and broader notice of
proposed actions, 21 the creation of dockets'
° and advisory committees.211
The government also is incorporating broad public participation procedures
into some of the economic environmental protections that it is implementing,
such as Project XL.212
The situation is a little different in the European Union and its Member
States. First, there is no general Administrative Procedures Act in the Euro-
pean Union that guarantees opportunities for public participation in govern-
206. See Bosselmann & Richardson, supra note 20, at 13 (discussing benefits of public
participation in drafting environmental legislation); Johnson, supra note 21, at 159 (same);
Rowe, supra note 26, at 89 (praising efficiency of broad inclusion in public decision-making).
207. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 159-60 (describing obstacles to participation in
decision-making by low income and minority groups); Rowe, supra note 26, at 89 (detailing
benefits of inclusive representation). Rowe suggested that "opportunities for participation
should be extensive, including devices such as committee membership, hearings, consultation,
advertising and special advocacy assistance. There should be a strengthening of interest group
representation in systematically disadvantaged communities." Id.
208. See 5 U.S.C. ch. 5 (1994).
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1994) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1994)
(Superfund); see also Johnson, supra note 21, at 159-61.
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(dX2) (1994) (Clean Air Act docket requirement for several
types of regulatory acts).
211. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1363, 1374 (1994) (Clean WaterAct advisory committees); 42
U.S.C. § 7417 (1994) (Clean Air Act advisory committees).
212. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 161 (describing market-based programs to increase
participation by low income and minority communities).
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ment decisionmaking. To some extent, the subsidiarity principle of European
Union law suggests that rules regarding the procedures for public participation
inthe decisionmaldng of Member State governments are better left to Member
States than to the European Union."3 The subsidiarity principle prohibits
European Union institutions from taking actions in areas where they do not
exclusively have power under the European Union Treaties unless the Mem-
ber States cannot sufficiently achieve the objectives that the European institu-
tions seek to achieve.214
The subsidiarity principle also influences the nature of the public partici-
pation provisions that are included in the environmental directives of the
European Union. Usually, the directives include vague and general provisions
regarding public participation, and delegate broad discretion to the Member
States regarding the timing and form of participation. For instance, the IPPC
Directive merely requires that permit applications must be made "available for
an appropriate period of time to the public, to enable it to comment on them
before the competent authority reaches its decision."215 Similarly, the Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment Directive requires that "[a]ny request for
development consent and any information gathered pursuant to this directive
is to be available to the public," and the "public concerned" [as determined by
the Member State] is to be afforded '"he opportunity to express an opinion
before the development consent is granted." '216
While Member States could establish broad public participation proce-
dures to implement the EU environmental directives, most countries have
adopted fairly modest public participation requirements. For instance, Ger-
man public participation requirements are quite limited. As Professor Karl-
Heinz Ladeur has noted,
The German administrative procedural law is characterized by a strong
orientation on the protection of a subjective right... it excludes of course
all kinds ofinterests from having a say in administrative decision-making.
And ifthey are given the possibility to be heard, at all, it may not be based
on a right in the strict sense but rather with reference to a purely adminis-
trative logic, i.e. as a kind of assistance given to the administration which
may have difficulty in taing all aspects of a case into consideration.
217
213. See Himsworth, supra note 91, at 294 (defining principle of subsidiarity - that Com-
munity should not interfere with matters that Member States are competent to handle internally).
214. See Treaty on European Union, art 3B, 31 I.L.M. 247, 258 (mandating that action
should be taken in accordance with principle of subsidiarity).
215. IPPCDirectivesupra note 179, art 15(1).
216. Council Directive 97/11, art. 6,1997 O.J. (L 73) 5.
217. Karl Heinz Ladeur, The German Conception ofAdministrative Procedure and Court
Control of Procedural Mistakes - The Example of Environmental Impact Assessments - A
European Law and Comparative Law View 1 (1998) (on file with author).
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Although the situation is a little different in the United Kingdom, its
public participation requirements are still somewhat limited. There is no
general Administrative Procedures Act in the United Kingdom, but there are
some judicially created general procedural requirements,2"8 and the King-
dom's environmental laws include some public participation requirements.
219
However, the public participation requirements in the environmental laws are
not very ambitious. For instance, a law that establishes a permit program for
air and water polluters requires permit applicants (rather than the government)
to advertise the application in a local paper, make information about the
application available during business hours in a location near the site of the
proposed permit, and notify the public that they can submit comments on the
application within twenty-eight days.' 0 The permit applicant, rather than the
government, controls the public participation processes. The Contaminated
Lands Act is another example of an environmental law that contains modest
public participation requirements. The Act requires the authority that is
cleaning up a hazardous substances site to pursue "reasonable consultation"
with various persons when it formulates a cleanup plan, but it does not require
that plans be made available to the general public for review or comment
before they are finalized.' While the air and water pollution permitting and
hazardous substance cleanup laws containiminimal participation requirements,
other environmental laws, such as the law that regulates waste management
licenses, do not include any requirements for government notification of, or
consultation with, the public prior to government action.'
As noted above, Member States also are failing to develop strong public
participation requirements for voluntary agreements, pollutant trading pro-
grams, and cost-benefit analyses. 21 Indeed, some commentators suggest that
public participation procedures are incompatible with market-based environ-
mental protection measures.224 On the contrary, though, pollutant trading
218. See Jones, supra note 17, at 574. For instance, courts often find that legislation
implicitly requires the government to give some prior notice, and provide an opportunity to
make representations, to persons likely to be affected by the government's exercise of its
powers, before it reaches a final decision or take an action. Id.
219. Id. at 565. For instance, many laws require the government, before issuing legislative
rules, to consult with parties identified generally or specifically in the legislation. Id.
220. Id. at 595-96.
221. See Healy, supra note 184, at 309 (explaining that Act "requires that the enforcing
authority pursue reasonable consultation -with directly affected persons prior to serving the
remediation notice" but does not require general review or comment).
222. See Jones, supra note 17, at 596 (stating that, under waste management license law,
"[there is no provision for consultation with the public").
223. See supra notes 170-172, 205, and accompanying text (discussing lack of public
participation).
224. See Rowan-Robinson & Ross, supra note 20, at 268 (stating that "the drive to bring
ECONOMICS V EQUITY H THEEUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 453
programs can only succeed, and rights will only be traded, if trading programs
include rigorous enforcement and monitoring provisions.' Public participa-
tion in enforcement and monitoring, as well as in the trading process, should
strengthen trading programs, rather than frustrate them.226
While public participation procedures in economic environmental protec-
tion measures and traditional regulatory programs in the European Union and
its Member States may not be overly ambitious at present, they likely will be
strengthened considerably over the next few years due to the Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making, and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention),' 1 which has been
described as a "milestone in European environmental policymaking."Q28 The
Convention was signed by thirty-five countries and the European Union,
excluding Germany,' and requires countries to follow several procedures
when issuing permits for activities that are covered by the Convention."
Specifically, countries must notify citizens, by public or individual notice, of
permitting actions early in the decision-making process." The notice must
identify the proposed activity, the agency responsible for decision-making,
and the procedures for public participation." 2 Countries must allow the public
to submit any comments, information, analyses or opinions that it considers
relevant to the proposed activity. 3 Further, countries must ensure that the
final decision is made accessible to the public promptly, with the reasons and
the discipline of the market to environmental protection would not seem to be obviously com-
patible with the drive to promote public access to information and public participation").
225. Greenhouse Gas Green Paper, supra note 128, at 5.
226. See id. at 9 (reasoning that "involvement of companies in emissions trading 'will be
cost effective"').
227. U.N. Doe. ECE/CEP/43 (1998), athttpV/www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/collectionl
notpubll27-13eng.htm (last visited Feb. 6,2001) [hereinafterAarhus Convention].
228. See Sean T. McAllister, Human Rights and the Environment: The Convention onAc-
cess to Information, PublicParticipation in Decision-Making, andAccess to Justice in Environ-
mentalMatters, 1998 COLO. J. INT'LENVTL.L. &POL'Y 187,188 (1998) (describing convention
as "milestone" because it "could increase citizens access to environmental information").
229. Id. at 188. The United States did not sign the Treaty because it felt that ratification
was inappropriate because the Treaty dealt mostly with European issues, and because the prin-
ciples in the Treaty were already part of United States law. Id. at 197.
230. Id. at 193. The activities covered include: (1) energy production; (2) metal produc-
tion and processing; (3) mineral and chemical production activities; (4) waste management
activities,; (5) paper and pulp production; (6) transportation infrastructure development;
(7) animal-based food production activities; (8) water resources transfers, and (9) other
activities that could have a significant effect on the environment. Id. at 193.
231. Aarhus Convention, supra note 227, art. 6(2).
232. Id. arts. 6(2), 6(3).
233. Id. art. 6(7).
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considerations on which the decision is based. 34 Although the Convention
includes less ambitious procedural requirements for rulemaking,' 5 on the
whole, it will require European Union countries to establish more aggressive
and inclusive public participation procedures. 6
B. Information Access Laws
While public participation procedures are vital to ensure that economic
and traditional regulatory environmental protection measures do not exacer-
bate problems of environmental injustice, access to information is essential to
effective public participation3 7  In many cases, access to information is
significantly influenced by wealth, and low income communities lack the
resources and contacts that are available to wealthier communities to obtain
information.3 As a result, even when environmental protection laws include
broad public participation requirements, the views of low income communi-
ties can be marginalized in environmental decision-making. Broad informa-
tion disclosure requirements can, therefore, increase opportunities for low
234. Id. art. 6(8).
235. Id. art. 8. Article 8 of the Convention provides that:
[e]ach party shall strive to promote effective public participation at an appropriate
stage, and while options are still open, during the preparation ... of executive
regulations and other generally applicable legally binding rules that may have a
significant effect on the environment. To this effect, the following steps should be
taken: (a) Time-frames sufficient for effective participation should be fixed;
(b) Draft rules should be published or otherwise made publicly available; and
(c) The public should be given the opportunity to comment, directly or through
representative consultative bodies. The result of the public participation shall be
taken into account as far as possible.
Id.
236. See McAllister, supra note 228, at 188 (stating that signatory countries will have to
alter their laws to comply with treat provisions).
237. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Public
Access to Environmental Information, COM (2000) 402, Expl. Mem. at 4, at http://europa.eu.
int/comm/environmentfdocum/00402 en.htm (last visited Nov. 7,2000) (proposing to increase
supply of environmental information to public) [hereinafterProposalfor anAmendedEUAccess
to Information Directive]; Dinah Shelton, Environmental Justice in the Postmodern World, in
ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND MARKET MECHANISMS, supra note 18, at 21, 27 (arguing that
right to information is prerequisite to public participation in decision-making). The importance
of access to information to informed public participation is a theme that appears in many
international treaties and European environmental materials, including the Aarhus Convention,
supra note 227, Principle 10, and Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, 1992,31 I.L.M. 876, and the United Kingdom's policy document, This Common
Inheritance, in Rowan-Robinson & Ross, supra note 20, at 267.
238. See Rowe, supra note 26, at 73 (noting that wealthier citizens have important advan-
tages in gaining information).
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income communities, and all communities, to participate in environmental
decision-making." 9  In addition, as noted above, information disclosure
requirements can remedy some of the market failures that prevent economic
environmental protection measures from operating efficiently.24
In the United States, the public is guaranteed access to environmental
information, and most other government information, through the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).241 Thus, much of the information relating to the
government's decisions in, and actions to implement, economic environmental
protection measures in the United States are accessible to the public under
FOIA. Environmental laws impose additional information disclosure require-
ments on federal, state and local governments.242 The European Union, how-
ever, has not enacted any broad freedom of information laws.243 Similarly,
many of the Member States do not have broad freedom of information laws.244
However, within the past decade, the European Union has taken a few
important steps to improve citizen access to environmental information. First,
in 1990, the European Union created the European Environment Agency to
239. Professor Sunstein argued, however, that information disclosure requirements may
have little effect on people who are undereducated, elderly or poor. See SUNSTEIN, supra note
30, at 339.
240. See supra note 41 and accompanying text see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 327-
28; Rowan-Robinson & Ross, supra note 20, at 267 (explaining that information allows fro
better consumer decisions). As Sunstein noted, information disclosure requirements can
remedy information deficits that are inherent in free markets and, therefore, can promote
economic efficiency. SuNsTEN, supra note 30, at 327-28.
241. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
242. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(cX3) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (Safe Drinking Water Act)
(requiring notice to owner or operator ofpublic water system); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9651, 9660 (1994)
(Superfund) (outlining process for selecting sites for Hazardous Materials research); 42 U.S.C.
§ 11044 (1994) (Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act) (requiring that
emergency response plans be made known to public).
243. The European Human Rights Convention provides may enable persons to obtain
information in limited situations, see infra notes 327-38 and accompanying text, but it is a far
cry from a "freedom of information" law.
244. See Public Sector Information: A Key Resource for Europe: Green Paper on Public
Sector Information in the Information Society, COM(98) 585, at Intro. § 3; David Vaver,
Recent CopyrightDevelopments in Europe, OxFoRD ELEC. J. INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS WP 06/9
(1999), at http'/www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0699.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2000) (stating that,
in Europe, "freedom of information laws are not the norm"); Friends of the Earth-Scotland,
National Campaigns-Access All Areas-New Freedom of Information Proposals for Scotland,
available at http'/www.foe-seotland.org.uk/nation/ej5.html (last visited Nov. 7,2000) (describ-
ing situation in Scotland). Although there have been several proposals for a broad freedom of
information law in the United Kingdom over the past few years, existing legislation only pro-
vides citizens with access to limited types of information. Interview with Kenneth Armstrong,
Professor, Queen Mary College, in London, England (Oct. 5, 2000); Telephone Interview with
Gordon Walker, supra note 54.
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collect, process, and distribute data on the environment.245 Perhaps more
importantly, in the same year, the Council of Ministers issued a Directive on
Public Access to Environmental Information that requires Member States to
provide access to environmental information possessed or controlled by the
government,246 and the European Commission recently has proposed substan-
tial amendments to the Directive, in part to comply with the requirements of
the Aarhus Convention.247 The proposed Directive even includes a provision
that requires Member States to ensure that persons who are denied informa-
tion from the government can challenge the denial in court or in an alternative
forum that is "expeditious and either inexpensive or free of charge.1
248
While the EU Directive and the proposed revision increase access to
environmental information, there are notable differences between the EU
approach and the FOIA in the United States, which could raise significant
barriers for low income communities and environmental justice. First, in
contrast to the United States approach, the scope of information that is avail-
able under the EU directive is limited to "environmental information," and
does not include information about the demographic composition of communi-
-ties that will be impacted by government action, socio-economic information,
or any other information that does not fit within the definition of "environ-
mental information., 249  Second, FOIA clearly describes the costs that the
245. See CouncilRegulation 1210/90,1990 O.J. (L 120) 1 (establishing European Environ-
ment Agency). However, the agency did not begin operating until 1994. See Brinkhorst, supra
note 14, at 5 (stating that agency did not begin operating until 1994). The agency does not have
broad rulemaking, enforcement and inspection powers like the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, but gathers information, acts as a clearinghouse, and publishes reports on
environmental issues, including a periodic State of the European Environment Report See
Hunter & Muylle, supra note 187, at 10298 (describing agency's powers).
246. Council Directive 90/313, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56 [hereinafter EUAccess tolnforma-
tion Directive]. While the Directive does not apply to the institutions of the European Union,
the Council of Ministers and Commission have adopted a Code of Conduct that provides public
access to Council and Commission documents, and, in a separate decision, the European Union
has provided access to documents held by the European Environment Agency. Hunter &
Muylle, supra note 187, at 10298.
247. See Proposalfor an Amended EUAccess to Information Directive, supra note 237,
at 2. The proposed directive is necessary "to correct the shortcomings identified in the practical
application of the [existing Directive].. ,; pave the way towards ratification by the European
Community of the [Aarhus Convention] ... [and] .. . adapt [the existing Directive] to develop-
ments in information technologies...." Id. Expl. Mem. at 2. While the existing Directive only
ensures freedom of access to environmental information, the Proposed Directive would create
a right of access to environmental information. Id. at 9.
248. Proposalfor anAmendedEUAccess to Information Directive, supra note 237, art. 6.
249. See EUAccess to Information Directive, supra note 246, art. 2(a). FOIA authorizes
persons to obtain any records from government agencies, as long as they don't fall within one
of the exceptions to disclosure, regardless of the type of information contained in them. 5
U.S.C. § 552(aX3) (1994).
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government can charge persons for access to information25° and provides an
exemption from fees for access to information for a public purpose.2' The
EU Directive merely requires that costs must be "reasonable," and does not
include any public purpose exemption from fees.2 Third, the EU Directive
allows government agencies two months to reply to a request for
information,23 in contrast to the twenty days required by FOIA.24 Fourth, the
exemptions from the disclosure requirements are much broader in the EU
Directive than in FOIA.25 Fifth, although FOIA requires agencies to explain
250. The law requires agencies to establish fee schedules for information access requests,
and limits the fees to the direct costs of document search, review and duplication. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(aX4)(iv) (1994). It fither specifies that costs may not include any costs incurred in
resolving issues of law or policy that may be raised in the course of processing a request. Id.
251. The law provides that
[d]ocuments shall be furnished without any charge or at a charge reduced below the
fees established under clause (ii) if disclosure of the information is in the public
interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the
operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial
interest of the requester.
5 U.S.C. § 552(aX4XAXiii) (1994).
252. EUAccess to Information Directive, supra note 246, art, 5. The Proposed Directive
does not provide any further guidance regarding what costs are "reasonable." Proposalfor an
Amended EUAccess to Information Directive, supra note 237, art. 5.
253. The Proposed Directive would reduce the response time to one month. See Proposal
for an AmendedEUAccess to Information Directive, supra note 237, art. 3(2Xa).
254. 5 U.S.C. § 552(aX6XA) (1994). In addition, although FOIA requires agencies to
provide information in the format requested, § 552(aX3)(B), the existing EU Directive does not.
The Proposed EU Directive would, however, change that Proposalfor anAmendedEUAccess
to Information Directive, supra note 237, art. 3(4).
255. For instance, the EU Directive includes a broad exemption for "the confidentiality of
the proceedings of public authorities," see EUAccess to Information Directive, supra note 246,
art. 3(2), while FOTA merely exempts "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX5) (1994). Similarly, while the EU Directive includes an exception
for non-disclosure of information that would adversely affect "international relations, public
security and national defence," see EU Access to Information Directive, supra note 246, art.
3(2), the FOIA exemption is limited to records
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order, (A) specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant
to such Executive order.
5 U.S.C. §552(bX1) (1994).
More significantly, though, the EU Directive exempts disclosure of any information that
would adversely affect "the interests of any person who supplied the information requested on
a voluntary basis unless that person has consented to the release of the information concerned."
457
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their reasons for failing to disclose information that is requested under the
law, and to file, and make publicly available, annual reports that describe the
number of FOIA requests that they received, and their responses and response
times to the requests, 256 the existing EU directive does not include any of
those transparency requirements. 7
Many of the differences outlined above are due to the fact that the EU
legislation is more vague and general than the United States legislation, and
leaves more discretion to the Member States. As noted previously, the
subsidiarity principle limits the legislative power of European Union institu-
tions in areas where the Treaties do not explicitly authorize European Union
action."5 In order to avoid legislating in areas that are outside of its jurisdic-
tion, therefore, the EU institutions often draft legislation in very general
terms, and grant Member States broad authority to implement the legislation
in a manner that is appropriate to their legal and regulatory structure." 9
While the EU Directive and proposed revision are more modest than
FOIA, they can, nevertheless, empower communities and consumers. One im-
portant feature of the proposed revision to the EU Directive is its emphasis on
technology, and the delivery of information through new technologies. The
Proposal clarifies that computerized records can be "environmental informa-
See EUAccess to Information Directive, supra note 246, art. 3(2). FOIA does not include such
an exemption. Finally, while FOIA requires agencies to redact protected information from
documents and provide requesters with the portions of the document requested that are not
privileged, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994), the existing EU Directive allows the government to
withhold entire documents if part of the documents are privileged.
256. 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1994).
257. Although the existing Directive doesn't require government agencies to explain the
reasons for withholding information, the Proposed Directive would require them to provide a
written notification of a refusal to make all or part of any information requested available, and
to state the reasons for the refusal. See Proposal for an Amended EUAccess to Information
Directive, supra note 237, Expl. Mem. at 14.
258. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (discussing subsidiarity principle).
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission's proposed revisions to the environmental
information directive indicates that the proposal "leaves it to the Member States to define the
practical arrangements under which environmental information should effectively be made
available respecting thereby the subsidiarity principle." Proposalfor an Amended EUAccess
to Information Directive, supra note 237, Expl. Mem. at 5.
259. As Professor Armstrong noted,
[t]he... introduction of the principle of subsidiarity... was symbolic of a fear
among Member States about the extension of Community competence and the
growth of[European Community] legislative activities.... [l]n its 1993 report on
adapting EU legislation to subsidiarity, the Commission referred to the need to
remove excessive detail from EU legislation, if national or international instruments
or controls could achieve the same goal.
Armstrong, supra note 111, at 756, 758.
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tion,t260 subject to disclosure and, more importantly, it requires governments
to maintain environmental information "in forms or formats that are readily
reproducible and accessible by computer telecommunications or by other
electronic means.""26 The Internet is a vital tool for accessing environmental
information and for organizing communities and interest groups on environ-
mental issues, and can be an important tool for environmental justice activ-
iStS.
262 While Internet access in Europe historically has been more limited
than in the United States, 263 partly due to high telecommunications costs 2'4 and
260. See Proposalfor an Amended EUAccess to Information Directive, supra note 237,
art. 2 (noting that environmental information includes electronic information).
261. Id. art7(1). The Explanatory Memorandum notes as follows:
the proposal will oblige Member States to have greater recourse to modem com-
puter technology for making information available to the public .... An active
policy of making information available to the public through modem computer
technology should enable many information searches to be carried out directly by
applicants. This should result in a reduction of the administrative costs incurred in
the handling of individual requests for access to environmental information. It will
also improve public understanding of the functioning of public authorities improv-
ing thereby public confidence.
Id. Expl. Mem. at 7.
262. See Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public
Participation andAccess to Government Infonnation Through the Interne4 50 ADMIN. L. REV.
277, 277-337 (1998) (providing more general critique of value of Internet as tool for accessing
information and increasing public participation); John Vidal, Modem Warfare: E-mail and the
NetAre Revolutionisng the Way Environment Human Rights and Social Justice Groups Work,
TBE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 13, 1999, at 4 (noting activists increased use of Internet to
further their causes). As Vidal suggested, the Internet has become "the most potent weapon in
the toolbox of resistance to globalism and the rampant free market" Vidal, supra, at 4.
263. Approximately 20% of the population of Western Europe had access to the Internet
by the end of 1999, see Lisa Kelly, Europeans Still Wary of Buying Online, VUNET.COM, at
http'/www.vnunetcomtprint60l80l (last visited Apr. 6,2001), compared to 50% of the popu-
lation in the United States. The level of Internet access within the European Union varies
greatly, with the highest levels of access in Norway (50%), Sweden (44%), and Finland (38%).
Matthew Wall, The Wired Divide, SUNDAY TIMES (London), April 23, 2000, 1 (Features). Less
than 20% of the German population has Internet access, and the level of access is even lower
in France (15%), and Greece (12%). Id.
264. See Wall, supra note 263, at 47 (observing that recent European telecom privatization
has spurred competitive forces and reduced online costs). The cost of Internet access in the
United Kingdom is twice as high as the United States, largely due to British Telecommunica-
tions' monopolistic control of access to the phone lines. See David Hewson, BTHolds the Net
to Ransom, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Sept 24, 2000, 49 (Features) (calling British Telecom
private monopoly and noting that British pay more than twice what Americans pay for Internet
access). Similarly, Spain's 6% Internet adoption rate is caused, in part, by the substantial
charges for telephone calls imposed by Telefonica and Retevision. See Doing the Bolsa Nova,
NEW MEDIA AGE, Dec. 16, 1999, at 29 (describing high cost of calls as hindrance to develop-
ment of Interet market in Spain).
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cultural factors,26 European Internet access and use is growing rapidly.2" The
explosive growth of mobile phones, and their nascent ability to access the
Internet, has played an important role in the trend, and telecommunication
reforms also have played a role in some countries.267 The European Union is
attempting to accelerate the European Internet revolution by proposing a
series of directives to reform and harmonize telecommunications laws in all
ofthe Member States.2" Increased European Internet access, coupled with the
revisions to the EU Environmental Information Directive, should mean in-
creased access to environmental information in the European Union. As noted
above, access to information is a vital safety net for communities as European
265. See Wall, supra note 263, at 1 (noting that culture is important aspect of Internet
adoption). With regard to the cultural factors, Nicholas Negroponte, director of the media
laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, suggested that "the dominance of North
American English as the web's chosen language has clearly accelerated take-up throughout
English-speaking countries.... The fiercely patriotic French... perceive the dominance of
English on the web as a kind of cultural imperialism." Id. He also argued that:
a liberal social and economic climate is essential if the Internet is to flourish....
Countries that respect individualism and entrepreneurship ... will readily embrace
the Interat .... Italy, Spain and Latin America all have a reputation for cash-
based underground economies that thrive irrespective of who is in power....
[T]hat attitude... is just right for nurturing the net .... [On the contrary], the
cultural forces in [Germany and France] - the centralism, the top-down nature of
management and government - mitigate against a bottom-up, decentralised, distrib-
uted world, which is what the Internet is all about.
Id. He even suggested that the different rates of Interet adoption in Europe are related to the
fact that "Internet access through personal computers has mostly been an indoors activity,"
while many European cultures center around outdoor activities. Id.
266. The population of Europeans online nearly doubled, from forty-one million to eighty-
one million, between 1998 and 2000. Kelly, supra note 263.
267. See Wall, supra note 263, at 1 (noting increased use of mobile phones and privatiza-
tion of telecom companies). Europe is forecast to overtake the United States in mobile phone
use by the end of 2000, and the "imminent impact of mobile phones cannot be overstated." Id.
Other factors that are fueling the European Internet revolution are the launch of free Internet
Service Providers, id., access to the web via television, and the growth of cybercafes. See
Cheap Bytes and Beverages at Net Cafes, CPIBfLAN SCL MONITOR, May 3, 2000, at 1 (detail-
ing Internet caf6 phenomenon).
268. In the press release announcing the proposals, the European Commission suggested
that the proposals "put particular emphasis on the stimulation of affordable high-speed Internet
access and providing a light touch legal framework for market players. This package of
proposals represents a comprehensive reform for telecommunications in Europe and is aimed
at providing the best conditions for a dynamic and competitive industry in Europe." See
European Commission, Press Release, at http'//europa.eu.intrapid/startcgi/guesten.ksh?p_
action.gettxt-gt&doc=]P/0O074910[RAPID&lg-EN (July 12, 2000). The package includes a
regulation to liberalize telecommunications markets by unbundling access to the local loop and
a directive to ensure that Member States maintain universal service obligations for telecommu-
nications providers. Id.
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countries move towards greater reliance on economic environmental protec-
tion measures.
C. Environmental Assessment Requirements
Environmental impact assessment requirements take advantage of the
benefits of public participation, access to information, and market forces to
empower citizens to play a vital role in governmental decision-making regard-
ing projects and decisions that could adversely affect their community. While
environmental impact assessment requirements may not apply to many of the
economic environmental protection measures, they can limit the disparate
impacts of traditional regulatory and permitting actions by government.
The European Union issued an Environmental Impact Assessment Direc-
tive in 1985,269 and amended it in 1997.270 The EU Directives are similar in
many ways to the environmental impact statement requirements ofthe National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the United States.Y Both laws require
the development of an environmental impact assessment for certain major
activities that may harm the environment before the activities can proceed. 2
Both laws merely establish procedural requirements for development projects
and do not prohibit actions that will have adverse environmental impacts."
However, there are some differences between the EU approach and the
NEPA that are significant for environmental justice. First, even when an envi-
ronmental impact statement is not mandated the NEPA requires government
actors to consider environmental impacts and alternatives to proposed actions.
269. Council Directive 85/337, 1985 O.J. (L 175)40 [hereinafter OriginalEIA Directive].
270. Council Directive 97/11,1997 O.J. (L 73) 5 [hereinafterAmendedEA Directive].
271. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
272. NEPA requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement for proposals
for legislation and major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC) (1994). The EU Directive takes a different approach and
specifically identifies the projects for which an environmental impact assessment must be
prepared. AmendedEIA Directive, supra note 270, Annex I. In a separate Annex, the Directive
lists other projects for which an assessment may be required by Member States pursuant to
criteria or requirements established by the Member States. Amended EIA Directive, supra note
270, Annex II.
273. See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983) (noting that Court's
only task under NEPA is to determine if agency considered relevant factors and articulated
rational connection between factors found and choice made). The Court has stated that "NEPA
itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process ....
Other statutes may impose substantive environmental obligations on federal agencies, but NEPA
merely prohibits uninformed - rather than unwise - agency action." Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989). Similarly, the EU Directive imposes
procedural, rather than substantive, requirements. See Hunter & Muylle, supra note 187, at
10299 (noting that directive does not provide substantive environmental protection standards;
rather, it provides procedural requirements).
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The EU directive, however, does not include any general environmental assess-
ment requirement.274 In fact, unlike the NEPA, the EU Directive establishes a
system in which the environmental planning requirement is imposed on private
developers rather than the government." Second, while the regulations
promulgated pursuant to the NEPA require agencies to identify alternatives to
a proposed action, including a "no action" alternative, and the environmental
impacts of those alternatives, 6 the original EU Directive did not require any
identification of alternatives. The revised EU Directive only requires an outline
of the main alternatives considered by the developer and leaves the developer
with complete discretion to determnine what alternatives should be consid-
ered.2 7 Third, unlike the NEPA,278 the EU Directive does not seem to require
or authorize persons to consider or weigh the socioeconomic impacts of a
proposed action (i.e. does the action adversely affect a low income or minority
community?) in the environmental impact assessment." Fourth, the EU
Directive only includes vague, general requirements for public participation
and leaves the development of detailed participation processes to the Member
States. 2 ' Finally, while an EIS and the government's failure to prepare an EIS
can be challenged in court in the United States, the EU Directive does not
require Member States to establish any system ofjudicial review to challenge
environmental impact assessments or the failure to prepare an assessment.
21
274. Even when an environmental impact statement is not required, NEPA requires
agencies to "study, develop and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of
action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of
available resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1994).
275. SeeAmended ELI Directive, supra note 270, arts. 3, 5 (imposing environmental plan-
ning requirement on private developers).
276. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, 1508.25 (1999) (describing what actions, alternatives and
impacts agencies must consider in determining scope of environmental impact statements).
277. AmendedEA Directive, supra note 270, art. 5; see also Hunter & Muylle, supra note
187, at 10299.
278. See Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA's in the Questfor Environmental Justice,
30 LoY. L. L. REV. 565, 579-88 (1997) (noting that NEPA requires federal government to
consider socioeconomic and health effects when it prepares Environmental Impact Statement).
279. The Directive requires the developer to identify the effects of the project on "[(1)]
humans, fauna, and flora; [(2)] soil, water, air, climate and the landscape; [(3)] material assets
and the cultural heritage; and [(4)] the interaction between [these elements]." Amended EIA
Directive, supra note 270, art. 3. Perhaps the effects on "humans" or the "cultural heritage"
could be read broadly to include socioeconomic impacts, but the courts have not yet interpreted
the language in that manner. In addition, while NEPA refers to assessing the impacts of a
proposed action on the "human environment," the EU Directive refers simply to "environmental
effects." Amended ELA Directive, supra note 270, art 5.
280. See Amended ELI Directive, supra note 270, art. 6 (stating that information must be
made available to public for comment).
281. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360,375 (1989) (stating that court
can review agency action). Although NEPA does not include a judicial review provision, the
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The environmental impact assessment laws of the Member States repli-
cate many of these differences, especially if the laws merely adopt the provi-
sions ofthe EU Directive and do not impose more stringent requirements. For
instance, the Town and Country Planning Regulations,282 which govern
environmental impact assessment in the United Kingdom, only require devel-
opers to provide an outline of alternatives that they considered, do not require
the developers to consider socioeconomic impacts of their action, and do not
include a general environmental assessment requirement.283 Further, they
establish modest public participation requirements and the developer, rather
than the government, controls these requirements. 4 Fortunately, the regula-
tions do provide for judicial review of regulatory violations.s
D. Access to Justice
Public participation provisions, information access requirements, and en-
vironmental impact assessment requirements enable citizens to play a greater
Administrative Procedure Act creates a right of review for final agency actions under NEPA.
Id. The general federal question jurisdictional statute enables federal district courts to hear
challenges to an agency's environmental impact statement, or failure to prepare an environmen-
tal impact statement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (stating that "district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treatises of the
United States"). The district court will review the agency's decision to proceed without
preparing an EIS or EA under the "hard look" arbitrary and capricious standard. See Marsh,
490 U.S. at 376 (concluding that proper standard of review is "arbitrary and capricious"); see
also David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanationsfor
a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 551, 562 n.52 (1990) (noting Justice Stevens's opinion inMarsh
that courts should apply arbitrary and capricious standard when determining whether EIS was
required). As part of that analysis, a district court will determine whether the agency looked at
all of the relevant factors before it decided to proceed without preparing an EIS or EA. See
Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378 (concluding that court must review whether agency looked at "relevant
factors" (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971)).
282. England and Wales Town and Country Planning Regulations (1999), SI 1999/293,
available at httpv/www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si1999/99029303.htm. (last visited March 29, 2001).
283. See id. sched. 4 (stating that applicant must include "outline of main alternatives
studied").
284. See id. §§ 14, 17, 18 (citing examples of regulations controlled by developers). For
instance, Regulation 14 requires the developer, rather than the government, to publish a notice
in the paper that states that the developer has applied for development approval, and describes
the process for public participation in the development review. See id. § 14 (stating that
applicant must publish notice and make clear how public can participate). Similarly, it is the
developer's responsibility to ensure that information about the development proposal and the
environmental impact statement are made available to the public. See id. § 17 (mandating that
applicant is responsible for making reasonable number of copies available). Further, the
developer can charge the public reasonable fees for copies of the information. See id. § 18
(allowing applicant to charge copy fees).
285. See id. § 30 (authorizing judicial review under Section 288 of Town and Country
Planning Act 1990).
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role in environmental decision-making and possibly to prevent actions that
will adversely affect them. However, broad access to justice provisions is
equally important to empower communities in the battle for environmental
justice when an action or decision that adversely affects them has already been
taken.
286
Despite a few recent Supreme Court decisions that tightened standing
requirements, 287 citizens in the United States enjoy fairly broad access to
courts to challenge violations of environmental laws that may harm them.
Most of the federal environmental statutes include "citizen suit" provisions
that explicitly authorize individual citizens to sue to enforce the statute.' As
long as the action that the plaintiff is challenging has caused her to suffer, or
will imminently cause her to suffer, some actual injury (no matter how small),
and the relief that she is seeking will redress that injury, the plaintiff generally
will have standing to sue." 9 In addition, most of the statutes include provi-
sions that authorize courts to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party,
286. See John E. Bonine, Standing to Sue: The First Step in Access to Justice, Remarks
for the Mercer Virtual Guest Speaker Program, at http-/www.law.merer.edu/elaw/standingtalk.
html (last visited June 18, 2001) (discussing importance of public access to justice). As Profes-
sor John Bonine argued,
Widespread access to justice is more likely to result in equal justice. Of course,
inequalities will always exist. Those with power and resources will always have a
bigger effect on governmental and private decisions than those lacking power and
resources. But this inequality is magnified where access to courts is restricted,
because restrictions are less likely to affect powerful economic interests. They
easily have access to the courts .... Citizens and their organizations often do not
have such equal access to justice ....
Id.
287. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (deciding
environmental group has no standing to sue). But see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-88 (2000); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 26 (1998)
(deciding that group of voters has standing to challenge FEC determination); Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 178-79 (1997) (concluding that ranch operator and irrigation districts met
standing requirements).
288. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(gX1) (1994) (containing Endangered Species Act citizen
suit provision); 33 U.S.C. §1365(aX1) (1994) (containing Clean Water Act citizen suit provi-
sion); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1994) (containing Resource Conservation and Recovery Act citizen
suit provision); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994) (containing Clean Air Act citizen suit provisions);
42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994) (containing Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act citizen suit provision).
289. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181 (stating that "relevant showing" is injury
to plaintiff); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (describing three
elements of standing); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-741 (1972) (stating that
standing requires individualized injury). The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the interest
that they are seeking to protect through litigation is arguably within the zone of interests sought
to be protected by the statute under which they are suing. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (stating that standing requires plaintiff's interest to
be within "zone of interests").
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thus reducing the financial disincentive for citizens to sue.29 Further, provi-
sions for class action suits enable citizens collectively to sue for claims that,
individually, would have been cost-prohibitive to prosecute."g Contingency
fee provisions also reduce the financial impediments to bringing a law suit.'
Although financial and other barriers to universal access to justice in the
United States still remain, 293 citizen enforcement is a centerpiece of American
environmental law."4
Despite the fact that citizen enforcement also is recognized as an impor-
tant component of environmental protection in Europe,' 5 citizen enforcement
of European Union law is more limited than in the United States. Article 230
of the Treaty of Rome authorizes a "natural or legal person" to file suit in the
European Court of Justice "' to challenge and seek to annul regulations, direc-
290. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(gX4) (1994) (allowing cost of litigation under Endangered
Species Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1994) (authorizing reward of litigation costs under Clean
Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1994) (allowing reward of litigation costs under Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1994) (permitting litigation costs under
Clean Air Act).
291. See Verchick, supra note 29, at 776 (noting that class action suits "allow citizens to
pool their claims in order to fund and staff litigation that no member could individually main-
tain").
292. See id (stating that contingency fees allow plaintiffs who ordinarily would not be able
to sue to bring lawsuits).
293. See Verchick, supra note 29, at 775 (explaining disadvantages of bringing suit). As
Professor Verchick observed,
[L]ocal community groups or neighborhood coalitions lack the resources to identify
environmental violations in their areas or to bring lawsuits .... Larger, national
environmental groups traditionally have shown little interest in championing the
causes of poor, minority areas .... Attorney's fee provisions are too stingy ....
Courts remain skeptical when certifying classes involving environmental torts.
Well-heeled industrialists still threaten to "out-gun" the small litigant.
Id. at 775-77.
294. See Stephen M. Johnson, Private Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article 17 and Environ-
mental Citizen Suits, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 383,384-385 (2001) (stating that "[c]itizen suits are
a major component of the enforcement program for federal environmental laws").
295. See Verchick, supra note 29, at 768 (explaining that European Community officials
view citizen enforcement as effective). Citizen involvement is vital because the European
Commission does not have the resources to adequately enforce the environmental directives of
the European Union, and it often lacks information about implementation, or non-implementa-
tion, of the directives in Member States. Id. at 782. While Member States can sue other
Member States in the European Court of Justice, no Member State has ever sued another
Member State to enforce an environmental directive. Id.
296. See Flynn, supra note 88, at 19 (describing composition of European Court of Justice).
The European Court of Justice is the judicial body of the European Union. Fifteen Judges and
nine Advocates-General make up the European Court of Justice. Id. at 19. A Judge assigns an
Advocate-General to each case. Id. at 19-20. The Advocate-General provides a nonbinding
decision on the case to the Judges who, in turn, decide each case in unanimous opinions. Id.
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tives, or enforcement decisions of European Union institutions.2" Article 232
authorizes a "natural or legal person" to sue European Union institutions when
they fail to act as required by the Treaty.2" However, unlike in the United
States, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the challenged action "is of direct and
individual concem." This requirement can present problems for plaintiffs.
First, because most of the European Union environmental legislation is in the
form of Directives, the legislation will not directly impact a plaintiff until a
Member State adopts it.30° Further, to the extentthat other persons will suffer
injuries that are similar to the plaintiff, the plaintiff will not be individually
affected by the action .3 ' The "direct and individual concern" test, thus, raises
important barriers to access to justice. In fact, as of 1997, individuals have
brought only six cases before the European Court of Justice under Article 230




However, because most of the European Union environmental legislation
will be implemented in Member States only after it is adopted by the State,
many of the actions that individuals may wish to challenge in court will not
297. See CONSOIDATED EU TREATIS, supra note 18, at 272, art. 230 (allowing person
to "institute proceedings against a decision"). Article 230 (ex Article 173) applies to actions
of the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, joint
actions of the Council and the European Parliament, and actions of the European Parliament
that are intended to produce legal effects on third parties. Id. It does not apply to actions of
Member States. Id. The Court can annul an action of a European Union institution on any of
four grounds: (1) "lack of competence;" (2) infringement of an essential procedure; (3) in-
fringement of the Treaty of Rome or any related rule of law (including general principles of
European Union law and international law); or (4) "misuse of powers." Id.
298. See id. at 273, art. 232 (stating that person may complain to European Court of Justice).
299. See id. at 272-273, art. 230, 232 (stating that person may sue if institution "has failed
to address to that person any act other than a recommendation or opinion"). Plaintiffs also can
sue if the decision is addressed to them, but few decisions ever mention individuals by name.
See Verchick, supra note 29, at 777 (explaining that plaintiff could sue if ruling specifically is
addressed to plaintiff).
300. See Verchick, supra note 29, at 778 (describing case in which European Court of
Justice denied standing to plaintiff because Member State was not required to adopt challenged
directive).
301. See id. at 777-79 ("Persons ... [may] claim to be concerned individually only if the
decision affects them because of certain characteristics which are peculiar to them or by reason
of a factual situation which is, as compared with all other persons, peculiarly relevant to them,
and by reference to which they may be individually described in a way similar to the addressee
of the decision.") (citing Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, 1963 E.C.R. 95, 107
(1964)).
302. See Verchick, supra note 29, at 781 (noting that as of 1997 plaintiffs lost on standing
in all six cases brought); see also Flynn, supra note 88, at 25-26 (describing dim prospects for
citizen lawsuits before European Court of Justice). Private parties also do not have a right to
intervene in actions brought in the European Court of Justice by Member States or European
Union institutions. See id. at 26.
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likely be actions of the European Union Institutions, but rather, actions or
inactions of their own government. Article 234 of the Treaty of Rome autho-
rizes courts in the Member States to refer to the European Court of Justice
questions concerning a Member State's compliance with or violation of Eur-
opean Union law, or the validity of the European Union law, or of actions of
the European Union Institutions. 3 However, referral by the courts of the
Member States is discretionary.3 4 Further, plaintiffs can only raise these
issues in courts of Member States if they can get into court in the State inthe
first place.
Access to justice is more limited in many Member States than in the
United States. Explicit citizen suit provisions are less prevalent in Europe."'
Standing barriers also may prevent plaintiffs from suing." In Italy and
Germany, for instance, environmental groups can participate in legal actions
related to their interests if they have registered their interests with the govern-
ment and the government has recognized them through a decree."° Financial
considerations also can limit access to justice in some countries. For many
years, the illegality of contingency fee arrangements in the United Kingdom
was a disincentive to private lawsuits for environmental wrongs.ca Class
actions also are very restricted in European countries."
While the European Union theoretically could require Member States to
provide more access to courts in their countries, the Union has been reluctant
to take that step.310 Once again, the Aarhus Convention could change this
303. See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATJES, supra note 18, at 273-274, art 234 (explaining
jurisdiction of European Court of Justice).
304. See CONSOLDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, at 274, art. 234 (noting that court
of Member State can request Court ofjustice to give ruling); see also Verchick, supra note 29,
at 780 (stating that "the decision to refer E.C. issues is generally within the national court's dis-
cretion").
305. See Cliona J.M. KimberEnvironmentalFederalism: a Comparison ofEnvironmental
Federalism in the UnitedStates andtheEuropean Union, 54 MD.L. REV. 1658,1681-82 (1995).
306. Id.
307. See Bonine, supra note 286 (noting that Italy and Germany allow registered groups
to sue). The European Commission developed a proposed access to justice directive based on
this model in 1992, but the directive was never adopted. See Verchick, supra note 29, at 783-84
(explaining "access to justice" directive).
308. See Jones, supra note 17, at 570 (describing recent allowance of contingency fee as
possibly having effect on willingness to sue); Verchick, supra note 29, at 784-85 (stating that
contingency fees were viewed as "unethical").
309. See Verchick, supra note 29, at 784-85 (stating that European countries restrict class
action suits).
310. See Hlnisworth, supra note 91, at 291. Himsworth stated:
The efficacy of Community law, and in particular, its capacity to be equally applied,
enforced and, as necessary, challenged by those with a wish to do so across all
Member States depends on consistency of approach across the Community ....
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dramatically. Article 9 of the Convention provides that citizens of countries
that sign the Convention must be able to judicially challenge any act by a
public authority or private party that violates national environmental laws. It
also states that courts in the signor countries must be able to enjoin violations
or provide other forms of equitable reliefto plaintiffs. Even ifthe European
Union enacts legislation to implement this requirement, standing may still be
an impediment to lawsuits in Member States because Article 9 provides that
countries can limit access to justice to plaintiffs who have a "sufficient
interest" in the lawsuit, consistent with national laws, as well as the spirit of
the Convention.
312
E. Constitutional or International Environmental Rights
To the extent that economic measures are used to protect the environ-
ment, each of the measures described above can be used to empower commu-
nities to participate in the marketplace for environmental rights, without
fundamentally altering the underlying market. Laws that explicitly require
government decisionmakers to consider whether their actions disparately
impact low income or minority communities also could enhance the bargain-
ing power of communities while leaving the market structure intact, although
neither the United States nor the European countries have focused heavily on
this approach.
313
Another approach, however, that could be used to protect low income and
minority communities which could fundamentally alter the balance of power
in the market for environmental rights. Instead of merely requiring govern-
ments to consider the impacts oftheir actions, laws could prohibit governments
[H]owever, that logical demand. . . has collided with resistance generated within
national legal systems and sympathetically accommodated by the Court of Justice.
It has been a resistance to any substantial harmonisation of domestic court proce-
dures... in consequences of guidance laid down in Court of Justice decisions. In
recent years this approach has been paraded under the broad banner of subsidiarity.
Id.
311. See Aarhus Convention, supra note 227, art. 9 (stating that person who has been
wronged should have "access to review procedure"); see also McAllister, supra note 228, at
194-195 (describing Article 9 provision to allow judicial review of agency's denial of citizen's
request for environmental information).
312. See Aarhus Convention, supra note 227, art. 9 (mandating that person "having a
sufficient interest" should receive judicial review).
313. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 162-165 (discussing whether command and control
safety nets are necessary to protect low income communities in market based environmental
protection system); Rowe, supra note 26, at 87 (noting that "exercise of administrative discre-
tion should expressly include the distributive effects of environment-related decisions"). As
Rowe noted, instead of prohibiting actions that harm communities, the laws could allow the
government to take actions that harm communities as long as the communities are compensated
for the harms. Id.
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from taking actions that disparately impact low income and minority communi-
ties, including the approval of pollution trades or the waiver of regulatory
requirements through agreements. 14 Although federal environmental laws in
the United States and Europe generally do not take this approach, 315 several
European countries have created a constitutional right to a clean or healthy
environment.316 The creation of a constitutional right to a clean environment
could, theoretically, transform the market for environmental rights as funda-
mentally as a prohibition on actions that disparately impact communities.
More than fifty countries in the European Union including Austria, Switzer-
land, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal have established this type of consti-
tutional "right."317  Similarly, several international declarations, including
the Stockholm Declaration, 318 the Declaration of the Hague,319 and the Rio
Declaration recognize a "right" to a healthy environment.3 2 While the United
States has acted more aggressively than many European countries in creating
access to justice and strengthening public participation, information access,
technical assistance, and environmental assessment requirements, it has not
314. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 162 (discussing failure of environmental laws to con-
trol government action).
315. Id. at 162-65 (noting that existing provisions of United States environmental laws
could be used to require government to consider demographic impacts of its actions). Although
environmental laws do not prohibit government discrimination, the Equal Protection clause of
the United States Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibit government actions
that discriminate against persons based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). These measures do
not, however, provide any protection for the poor, independent of the racial protections.
316. See Ernst Brandl & Hartwin Bungert, ConstitutionalEntrenchment ofEnvironmental
Protection: A ComparativeAnalysis ofFxperiencesAbroad, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1,14-15
(1992) (discussing proposals in United States for constitutional right to clean environment);
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Right of the Child to a Clean Environment, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 611,
616 (1999) (noting that more than fifty constitutions include provisions for clean environment).
317. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 316, at 616 (noting countries that have included right to
clean environment in their constitutions). However, many of the larger European countries,
such as Great Britain, do not have constitutional protection for environmental rights. See Jones,
supra note 17, at 562 (noting Great Britain's lack of written constitution).
318. Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration provides that "Man has the fundamental
right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that
permits a life of dignity and well being .... ." Report of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment June 16, 1972, U.N. Doe. AICONF. 48/14/Corr. 1 (1972), 11 LL.M.
1416,1417 (1972).
319. The 1989 Declaration of the Hague rcognizes "the right to live in dignity in a viable
global environment...." Hague Declaration on the Environment, March 11, 1989,28 LL.M.
1308, 1309 (1989).
320. Principle I of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development provides
that "[h]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development They are
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature." United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June
13, 1992, U.N.C.E.D. Doe.AICONF. 151/5/Rev. 1, 31 IL.M. 874, 876 (1992).
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taken the bold step of constitutionally recognizing the importance of environ-
mental protection.
While critics argue that many of the provisions are merely aspirational
and unenforceable,321 the "endowment effect" created by government recogni-
tion of the right to a minimal level of environmental quality could play an
important role in the marketplace for environmental rights.322 Thus, a consti-
tutional environmental right could be a valuable tool in the battle for environ-
mental justice in Europe, and the United States could import the concept. It
is important to frame the "right" narrowly, to ensure that its enforcement.3
Instead of a "right to a clean or healthy environment," it may be useful to
establish a right to be free from government action that affects the environ-
ment in a way that harms human health. If the United States were to adopt
that approach, it would empower low income and minority communities in the
United States in at least two ways. First, if plaintiffs challenged government
actions as a violation of equal protection or due process guarantees, the courts
may subject government action to a higher level of scrutiny due to the consti-
tutional recognition of a fundamental right to a certain level of environmental
protection. More importantly, litigants would have a separate cause of action,
in addition to equal protection, due process, and other existing causes of ac-
tion, to pursue if the government were to take some action that threatened to
harm their health by harming the environment.
Calls for an environmental rights amendment in the United States are not
novel. 24 Indeed, since the late 1960s, everyone from school children to major
environmental groups have lobbied for various forms of "environmental rights"
amendments to the Constitution." Professor J.B. Ruhl recently criticized prior
proposals for constitutional environmental rights amendments on the grounds
that, unlike any prior constitutional amendments that the United States has
adopted, these proposals were merely aspirationa 326 and attempted to regulate
321. See J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics Of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed
Environmental QualityAmendmentsDon 'tMeasure Up, 74 NOTREDAMEL. REV.245, 252 n22
(1999) (noting limited power of many constitutional provisions concerning environment).
322. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing endowment effect).
323. See Rowe, supra note 26, at 85-86 (proposing method of legislating to ensure discrim-
ination avoidance); Ruhl, supra note 321, at 254 (describing requirements for effective environ-
mental amendment to Constitution).
324. See J. William FutreliEnvironmentalRights andthe Constitution, in AMEIuCAN LAW
INSTUE-AERICANBARMASOCIATION,BLSINSOFLIBERTY THECONSTrrUTIONANDThE
PRACTIcE OFLAW43, 50 (1988) (advocating Constitutional amendmentforenvironmental rights);
Ruhl, supra note 321, at 247-48 (notingtrend of proposals for environmental amendments).
325. See Ruhl, supra note 321, at 247-48 (discussing lobby to enact environment amend-
ment). While the proposals slowed in the 1980s, they reemerged when federal environmental
laws were strengthened. Id. at 248-49. These proposals arose in response to concerns about
conservation of biodiversity. Id.
326. RuhI noted that "[n]o purely aspirational expressions exist in any amendment to the
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relations between citizens, rather than between the citizens and government.3"
However, the proposal for a rightto be free from government action that affects
the environment in a way that harms human health focuses on relations be-
tween the government and citizens and operates to prohibit specific govern-
ment actions or create individual rights. This proposal, therefore, is quite
similar to the existing Amendments to the Constitution." While this proposal
does not go as far as prior suggestions for constitutionalized "environmental
rights," it would be a significant tool in the fight for environmental justice
because government action or inaction has caused many of the existing envi-
ronmental inequities."
Constitution.... [T]he absence of aspirational text in the United States Constitution is one of
its defining characteristics." Icl at 258.
327. See id. at 253-54 (explaining that environmental quality amendments do not govern
citizen to citizen relations). Ruhl analyzed the Constitutional amendments in a biaxial matrix
based on the function and target of each amendment. Id. at 253. He suggested that there are
four possible institutional roles for amendments (the function), including: "(1) altering the
operational rules of government; (2) prohibiting specified government action; (3) creating or
affirming rights; or (4) expressing aspirational goals." Id. The possible social relations that are
the target of each amendment include: "(1) intra and intergovernmental relations; (2) relations
between government and citizen; or (3) relations between citizens." Id. Ruhl argued that none
of the Constitutional amendments that have been adopted in the past were aspirational or
focused on relations between citizens, and that any amendment that attempts to do so should
satisfy several stringent requirements, called filters. Id. at 254. He outlined these filters-in his
article. Id. Because he determined that past environmental quality amendments, were aspira-
tional and focused on relations between citizens, Ruh analyzed them under his filters, and
found them lacking. Id. at 254-72.
328. Id. at 257, 259 (describing focus of existing amendments in context of restricting
government power over citizens).
329. For instance, studies have suggested that the federal government is bringing enforce-
ment actions under environmental laws and making cleanup decisions under Superfund in a
discriminatory manner. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for ALL, in UNEQUAL
PRoTECIoN: ENVIOpNrENTALJUsTICEAND COMMUNmEs OF COLOR 7-11 (Robert D. Bullard
ed., 1994) (arguing that application of environmental laws is not uniform); Marianne Lavelle
& Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection, the Racial Divide In Environmental Law, a Special
Investigation, NAT' L.J. S1, S2 (1992) (discussing unequal application of environmental
clean-up laws); Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity and Environmental Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS
649, 652 (1993) (same). Further, the federal government establishes regulations under a variety
of environmental laws to protect persons from exposure to hazardous levels of toxic substances
based on assumptions that may not protect various ethnic or racial communities. See Robert R.
Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative RiskAssessmen4 1996 U. ILL.
L. REV. 103,105 (1996) (stating that minority groups face higher risk of negative environmental
impact). In addition, federal, state, and local governments play an integral role in the siting of
hazardous waste facilities and industrial facilities, and studies indicate that hazardous waste
landfills and treatment facilities, and industries that emit the greatest amounts of toxic chemi-
cals, have been sited predominantly in minority or low-income communities. See COMMISSION
FOR RACIAL JusTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHIT, Toxic WASTES AND RACE INTHE UNiTED
STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARAcTERISliCS OF
COMMUNITIES WITH HAZAIDOUS WASTE SITES 23 (1987) (arguing minority communities are
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European citizens have relied on another environmental safety net that
is conceptually analogous to the constitutional right to a clean environment,
but that American citizens have not utilized in any significant way. Interna-
tional human rights conventions increasingly are being used to address envi-
ronmental harms, as human rights abuses and environmental degradation are
often closely linked.33 The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, and conventions such as the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights can all be used, to some extent, to protect communi-
ties and individuals from adverse health and environmental effects. 31 While
the conventions do not explicitly protect a right to a clean environment,332 they
more susceptible to negative environmental conditions); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN, NOT JUST
PRoSpERnY: AcIEvNGSUSTAINABILITYWrHENVIRONMENTALJUSTiCE 2 (1993) (examining
disparities of environmental amenities across different communities); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN
& LAURA FriTON, TOXICWASTES AND RACE REVISrrED: ANUPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT OF
THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNiTIS WrTH HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITES 14-15 (1994) (noting unequal enforcement ofenvironmental laws); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTG OF'CE, SNG OFHAZARDOUS WASTELANDFHLL AND THEa COUiELATIONwrrH
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNiES 17 (1983) (noting increasing
inequality in enforcement of environmental laws).
330. See Caroline Dommen, Claiming Environmental Rights: Some Possibilities Offered
by the UnitedNations'HumanRightsMechanisms, 11 GEo. INT'LENvTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998)
(discussing impact of environmental degradation on human rights laws); Shelton, supra note
237, at 26 (noting connection between environmental protection and human rights). As Dom-
men noted:
The relevance of human rights mechanisms is all the more apparent when one recalls
that the worst victims of environmental harm tend also to be those with the least
political clout, such as members of racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and those
who are geographically isolated from the locus of political power within their country.
Dornmen, supra, at 3.
331. See Dommen, supra note 330, at 4-7 (describing potential impact of U.N. human
rights regime on environmental protection); Francois Jarvis & Anne Sherlock, The European
Convention on Human Rights and the Environment, 24 EUR. L. REV. HR/I5 (1999) (discussing
Court of Human Rights cases that utilize European Convention on Human Rights to effect
environmental change); Shelton, supra note 237, at 27-28 (noting organizations that have util-
ized human rights principles to formulate policies concerning environment).
332. Professor Filzmaurice discussed the relationship between human rights and the right
to a clean environment as follows:
[There are broadly three main schools of thought. The first school strongly supports
the view that there are no human rights without an environmental right.... [A] right
concerning the environment is absolutely fundamental to the existence of other human
rights.
In contrast, another school of thought believes that a "generic international
environmental entitlement... is a highly questionable proposition." ... Finally, there
is a school of thought which takes an intermediate position. This school admits the
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often protect the right to seek and receive information, the right to participate
in public decision-making and governance, and the rights to life, health,
association, expression, personal liberty, equality, and legal redress.333 Ac-
cordingly, they provide many potential avenues for citizens to challenge
environmentally harmful actions that affect them. 3 4  Unlike international
environmental treaties, many of the major human rights conventions authorize
private citizen enforcement.3
There are, however, some important limits to the reach of human rights
conventions. First, the obligations in the conventions are binding only on
countries, and not on the citizens of the countries.336 Thus, citizens have lim-
ited available remedies.3 7 Furthermore, the treaties bind the countries only
existence of some environmental right, but believes it derives its existence from other
human rights.
Fitzmaurice, supra note 316, at 613.
333. See id. at 625-26 (describing environmental rights in context of other rights); Shelton,
supra note 237, at 26 (noting human rights protections that may also effect positive changes in
environmental policy). Article 2 of the CERD protects the right to be free from racial discrimi-
nation, Article 6 of the ICCPR protects the right to life, Article 27 protects the rights of
members of minorities, Article 17 protects the right to be free from interference with one's
private or family life, Article 6 of the ICESCR protects the right to safe and healthy working
conditions, Article 11 protects the right to an adequate standard of living, and Article 12 pro-
tects the right to health. See Dommen, supra note 330, at 10-11 (noting relationship between
human rights and environmental protection rights).
The European Convention includes several provisions that might be relevant to environ-
mental disputes. For instance, Article 2 provides that "no one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally" which has been interpreted to impose a positive duty on governments to safeguard
the lives of those within their jurisdiction. See Jarvis & Sherlock, supra note 331, HR/17
(analyzing Court of Human Rights' use of Article 2 to impose duty to safeguard citizens or
States). Article 8 creates a right to respect for private and family life, id. HRI20, and was utilized
by litigants in McGinley v.U.K.,App. Nos. 21825/93 and 23414/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 31-34
(court report) (1998); Guerra v. ItalyApp. No. 14967/89,26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357, 382-83 (court
report) (1998); Ostm v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 20 Eur. HR. Rep. 277, 287-291 (court
report) (1994); and Arrondelle v. U.K., App. No. 7889/77, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 118, 121 (court
report) (1992). Article 10, which creates a limited right to receive information, has also been
used with some success in environmental cases. See Jarvis & Sherlock, supra note 331, at 21.
334. Only a small number of environmental cases have been brought before the European
Court of Human Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, but such lawsuits
are becoming more frequent today. See Jarvis & Sherlock, supra note 331, HR/I5 (stating that
Court of Human Rights' exposure to environment cases is limited).
335. See Dommen, supra note 330, at 3 (contrasting ease of bringing human rights claim
with difficulty in bringing environment claim); Shelton, supra note 237, at 26-27 (discussing
ability of individuals to petition governments for redress of human rights abuses).
336. See Shelton, supra note 237, at 28 (noting that human rights obligations apply only
to States).
337. Under many of the United Nations Conventions, for instance, the Committee that re-
views compliance with the human rights requirements of the treaty cannot impose any sanctions
on countries for failing to comply with the treaty and can only issue a report that outline the
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if they have signed and ratified the treaties.33 In addition, communities and
individuals can use the treaties to challenge environmentally hanrful actions
only to the extent that they can demonstrate that the action violates some other
right that the treaties protect, such as the right to life. 39 The treaties do not
protect "public" rights. 340 Finally, in many treaties, standing requirements can
limit citizen enforcement.34' Nevertheless, when strong environmental con-
trols are not found in other international or domestic legislation, international
human rights conventions can provide a minimal safety net for communities
and the "rights" created by the treaties can have an impact in the marketplace
for environmental protection.
F. The Nature ofEuropean Law
It should not be surprising that European Union environmental laws, and
the safety nets those laws incorporate, are more modest than those of the
United States. The structure of the Union, and the process for developing
legislation within the Union, ensures that European Union laws will include
fewer procedures, regulatory requirements, or other protections for politically
or economically powerless communities or individuals within Member States.
First, as noted previously, European Union legislation generally creates
few procedural requirements and delegates broad discretion to Member States
regarding implementation of legislation because of the subsidiarity princi-
ple.342 Te Union has been particularly sensitive to subsidiarity concerns with
regard to environmental legislation over the last few years because it was
treaty violations. See Dommen, supra note 330, at 21 (acknowledging that Committee reports
are not biding on countries). Since the report is public, however, it can have some value in
motivating further citizen action at the national or local level, instead of at the international
level. Id. at 17-18.
338. See Dommen, supra note 330, at 21 (noting limitations to raising environmental
issues); Jarvis & Sherlock, supra note 331, HR/27 (noting limited redress to individuals whose
injuries occurred prior to country's signing). Even then, treaty provisions may not be enforce-
able in the countries that have adopted them. For instance, in the United Kingdom,
treaty provisions are not to be regarded by the courts as a direct source of U.K.
law... If the law in any part of the United Kingdom is found to be inconsistent
with the provisions of the Convention the obligation of the judge has been to give
effect to that non-conforming law, and to leave the disappointed litigant to whatever
remedy might be available in Strasbourg.
Jones, supra note 17, at 563.
339. See Jarvis & Sherlock, supra note 331, HR/iS (noting that design of European Con-
vention on Human Rights is "to protect civil and political rights").
340. See id. at 27 (discussing standing requirements for bringing claim under Convention).
341. See Dommen, supra note 330, at 28 (acknowledging that standing is problem with
raising environmental claims).
342. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (describing concept of subsidiarity
principle).
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criticized in the past for enacting environmental laws that were too prescrip-
tive and rigid. 43 The voting procedures for European Union environmental
legislation also affect the form of the laws. The drafting of environmental
laws must be in vague and general terms to attract broad support from Mem-
ber States and to ensure sufficient votes to enact the laws through the qualified
majority voting that applies to most environmental legislation."'
The "transnational conflict paradigm," hypothesized by Eyal Benvenisti,
suggests another reason why European Union environmental legislation does
not include strong public participation requirements, information access
requirements, or other provisions to protect low income or minority communi-
ties."' According to Benvenisti, while countries are not monolithic entities,
they often advocate positions in negotiations on international agreements that
are espoused primarily by small, well-organized interest groups, such as
producers and employers, whose positions are detrimental to other segments
ofthe country. 4 Because the interest groups are organizedtransnationally, the
groups can influence simultaneously the negotiating positions of many coun-
tries and ensure that the international agreements that the countries negotiate
advance their interests. Alternatively, they adopt a sufficiently laissez-faire
approach so as to not disturb their interests.347 The resulting agreement,
however, causes tensions within the countries that are parties to the agreement,
because the countries adopting monolithic negotiating positions often ignore
the interests of non-state third parties, such as workers and consumers.
3 48
Benvenisti suggested that employers and producers are able to co-opt the
agreement development process because it is easier for these groups to orga-
343. See Armstrong, supra note 111, at 772 (noting change in environmental regulatory
strategy). As Professor Armstrong noted, many of the Union's environmental directives have
been "reformed" to ensure that "regulatory activity is carried out further down the regulatory
chain and is refracted through the specific national administrative systems." Id. at 773.
344. Pursuant to the Treaty Establishing the European Community (The Maastricht Treaty),
qualified majority voting is sufficient for most environmental action, other than environmental
taxes, land use planning, water resources, and energy supplies, which require unanimous
approval. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 175, 0. . (C
340) 3 (1997) (outlining voting scheme for environmental action). In addition, the European
Union can adopt legislation to harmonize markets in the Union through qualified majority
voting. Id. art. 95.
345. See Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV.
167, 169 (1999) (noting that conflicts among well organized domestic interests groups with
strong political influence impede global action to protect smaller, less organized groups).
346. Id. at 169. Benvenisti contrasted his paradigm with the prevailing "Westphalian para-
digm," which suggests that countries are "unitary actors engaging in international competitions."
Id. at 168.
347. Id. at 169-71. Benvenisti argued that this pattem has been repeated from the "birth of
modem international law," id. at 175, through recent debates over global warming. Id. at 180.
348. Id. at 178.
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nize collectively since they are small. These groups also have a greater incen-
tive to organize because there are high per capita benefits to be achieved
through cooperation with other group members and low costs of monitoring
and sanctioning free riders.3 49 He also theorizes that small interest groups have
a competitive edge in obtaining, assessing and distributing information on
policies and laws due to their greater organizational capabilities.35 In the
context of European Union environmental legislation, his theory would explain
the lack of strong protections for low income and minority communities.
Although European Union environmental legislation does not include
strong protections for low income and minority communities, the legislation
of Member States could incorporate such provisions. However, economic
forces and the free market requirements of the European Union reduce the
incentive for Member States to include those protections. For instance, one
State could challenge legislation in another Member State that prohibits trans-
fer of pollution rights to a region that is disparately impacted by pollution, or
legislation that taxes new pollution sources in disparately impacted communi-
ties more stringently that other sources, as measures that restrict imports or
prevent companies from other Member States from establishing businesses in
that State, in violation of the Treaty of Rome.351 Countries have limited ways
to control the flow of solid and hazardous waste into or out of the countries
because of the importlexport restrictions withing the European Union.
352
Further, in the absence of strong protections for low income and minority
communities in European Union legislation, Member States have economic
incentives to avoid including even modest protections, such as public partici-
pation and information access requirements, if those protections discourage
companies from establishing businesses in the State. Because the Treaty of
Rome and European Union legislation attempt to reduce barriers to the free
movement of goods and services among Member States, States have an even
stronger incentive than in the United States to reduce environmental protec-
tion requirements to attract business in a race to the bottom.353
349. Id. at 171-172.
350. Id.
351. See supra notes 132, 142, 144, and 148, and accompanying text (discussing free trade
among Member States and elimination of trade barriers); see also infra note 352 (noting that
restrictions on imports and exports are not absolute).
352. See Verchick, supra note 29, at 758 (discussing factors that lead to active trading of
waste in European Union). According to Professor Verchick, exported waste "generally travels
from Member States with more restrictive environmental standards to those with less restrictive
environmental standards and from Member States where disposal costs are higher to those
where the disposal costs are lower." Id.
353. Id. at 758; see also Benvenisti, supra note 345, at 168 (noting that increasing global
competition hinders individuals' rights to participate in national decision-making process).
Professor Verchick argued that
476
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The race to the bottom is apparent not only in the failure of Member
States to enact stronger environmental protection measures on the national
level, but also in their failure to enforce and implement the legislation of the
European Union. Most of the European Union environmental legislation is
accomplished through directives, rather than regulations, and the Union has
limited resources to enforce the legislation; therefore, implementation and
enforcement of European Union environmental law is primarily a responsibil-
ity of the Member States.354 While the States vary in their commitment to the
environment,355 as a whole, Member States have been fairly lax in implement-
ing environmental directives of the European Union.5 6 While this has nega-
tive implications for communities that pollution adversely affects, it also
negatively impacts economic measures that the Union is attempting to use to
protect the environment. The Union's economic measures are unlikely to
thrive unless strong regulatory requirements also exist.357 Recent changes to
the economic disparity between Member States encourages less affluent countries
to sacrifice long-term environmental quality for short-term economic gain by posi-
tioning themselves as hosts for all sorts of industrial and development activity....
By making it easier for investment capital to search for the best opportunities
throughout the [European] Community, economic integration increases the tempta-
tion of Member States to sofipedal environmental enforcement in hopes of attract-
ing such investment.
Verchick, supra note 29, at 758.
354. See CoNsOuDATEDEUTREATIES, supranote 18, art. 175 (stating thatMemberStates
will find and implement European Union's environmental policy); Himsworth, supra note 91,
at 295 (same). Pursuant to Article 226 (ex Article 169), the European Commission can bring
an action in the European Court of Justice against a Member State that fails to fulfill its
obligations under the Treaty. See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 226. How-
ever, Article 226 prosecutions are discretionary, and the Commission rarely institutes an action
unless a complaint has been filed with the Commission. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note
14, at 240 ("Community environmental law only comes to life when it is incorporated within
national policies."). Delays in the complaints procedure can take up to four years, so Member
States may be out of compliance with European Union law for long periods of time before they
are prosecuted by the Commission. Id. at 241 n. 86. Also, while Article 227 of the Treaty of
Rome authorizes Member States to sue other States in the European Court of Justice, States
rarely institute such actions. See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 227 (pro-
viding that Member State that believes another Member State failed to comply with EU Treaty
may litigate in Court of Justice).
355. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 220 (noting differences in comprehen-
siveness of Member States' national environmental policy).
356. See Brinkhorst, supra note 14, at 8 (noting that 1992 report by Court of Auditors
concluded that there is "significant gap between the European Union environmental rules in
force and their actual application" (citing Special Report No. 3, 1992 O.J. (C 245) 1)). Due to
the lack of enforcement by Member States, the number of cases brought before the European
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance concerning non-implementation of environmen-
tal directives increased by 70% between 1995-1997 compared to the period of 1992-1994. Id.
357. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing role of economic measures
in European Union and need for governmental regulation for their success); see also Jones,
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European Union law that authorize the European Court of Justice to fine
States for failing to implement and comply with EU law and the Court's first
exercise of that power earlier this year may provide Member States with
greater incentives to implement and enforce EU environmental law. 58
Although the factors outlined above discourage the enactment of strong
public participation requirements, information access requirements, and sim-
ilar protections for low income and minority communities in the European
Union, other factors inherent in the structure of the Union provide a degree of
counterbalance. First, in order to appease the environmentally zealous coun-
tries within the European Union, Article 95 ofthe Treaty of Rome requires the
Union to base harmonization legislation on a "high level" of environmental
protection, instead of harmonizing State laws at the lowest common denomi-
nator.359 Second, while some European countries may "race to the bottom" in
setting environmental standards, other countries view a clean environment and
strong environmental provisions as assets to attract businesses. Indeed, the
Treaty of Rome authorizes countries to adopt environmental laws that are
more stringent than the European Union laws, as long as they are compatible
with those laws and the Treaty.360 Third, although the restrictions on imports
and exports in the Treaty of Rome seem to limit the power of countries to
enact legislative bans on activities to protect communities from disparate
impacts of pollution, the restrictions are not absolute." Over the past few
supra note 17, at 570-71 (noting that United Kingdom, for example, lacks system in which
administrative agencies impose penalties for violation of law, making regulation difficult).
358. See Brinkhorst, supra note 14, at 8 (citing rise in legal actions before Court of Justice
for failing to implement directives of European Union). The Maastricht Treaty authorized the
European Court of Justice to levy fines against Member States. On July 4, 2000, the Court
exercised the power for the first time by imposing a fine of $22,000 per day on Spain for failure
to implement European Union waste disposal laws. See European Court of Justice Imposes
First Penalty, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1533 (2000) (describing Court of Justice's first penalty
imposed for non-compliance with legislation).
359. See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art. 95 (implementing action
regarding health, safety, and environmental protection within European Union); Brinkhorst,
supra note 14, at 3 (noting that harmonization at lowest common denominator would not have
been acceptable to Member States).
360. See CONSOLIDATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, art 176 (providing that Member
States may implement more stringent laws as long as they are consistent with Treaty).
361. Article 30 (ex Article 36) of the Consolidated EU Treaties provides that the import
and export provisions of Articles 28 and 29 do not preclude prohibitions or restrictions "justi-
fied on grounds of public morality, public policy, or public security, [or] the protection of health
and the life of humans, animals or plants... " Id. art. 30. However, Article 30 also provides
that such prohibitions or restrictions shall not "constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination
or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States." Id. For laws that are facially dis-
criminatory, the Court utilizes a rule of proportionality, under which the government defending
the law must demonstrate that the same legislative goal cannot be achieved through "less restric-
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decades, the European Court of Justice has been more willing than the United
States Supreme Court to uphold bans on waste imports.362
VI. Economic Measures That Facilitate Environmental Justice
While this Article has focused on the potential inequities that economic
environmental protection measures could cause and the tools that countries
could use to minimize those inequities, there are some economic measures that
can enhance the prospects for environmental justice. These economic mea-
sures include pollution registers, pollution prevention laws, and labeling
requirements. The remainder of the Article focuses on those measures, and
compares the European initiatives with those in the United States.
A. Pollution Release and Transfer Registers
One of the most powerful and most successful economic environmental
protection measures is the pollution release and transfer register (PRTR).63
tive measures." See Verchick, supra note 29, at 760-61 (noting European Court of Justice's
narrow interpretation of Article 36s exception to EC Treaty Article 30).
362. Id. at 765-66 (showing willingness of European Court of Justice to uphold some
regional environmental laws that affect imports and exports among Member States). Professor
Verchick noted that the United States Supreme Court has struck down almost every challenged
state or local restriction on waste imports for the last twenty years, ensuring that "leachate and
fallout from waste facilities will occupy space in poorer, less populated, and more polluted
states throughout the country." Id. at 755. Quoting Justice Rehnquist, Verchick observed that
"[the law of economics suggests that landfills will sprout in places where land is cheapest and
population densities least." Id. As a result, he argued, "by erasing market borders in the name
of evenhandedness, courts insure a nonuniform geography of pollution 'hot spots' .... Within
state borders,... these same market forces will tend to push landfills, incinerators and other
polluting facilities into poorer communities, communities of color, and communities that have
less influence with local decisionmakers." Id.
While the European Union's efforts to discourage market barriers among Member States
resulted in similar patterns of waste distribution in Europe, the European Court of Justice con-
tinues to respond differently than the United States. Supreme Court to legislative efforts to curb
waste imports. Id. at 761-62, 765. For instance, in 1992, the European Court of Justice upheld
an embargo by the Wallonia region of Belgium against the import of waste from outside the
region. Id. at 764; see also C-2/90, Comm'n v. Belg. (Walloon Waste), 1992 E.C.R. 1-4431,1-
4480 (1992). Although the embargo appeared to be facially discriminatory, the court did not
review the Wallonia legislation under the strict scrutiny standard required by Article 30. Id.
Instead, the court determined that waste has a "special characteristic," and that accumulation of
waste constitutes a threat to the environment because of the limited capacity of each region or
locality for receiving it. Id. Most commentators suggest that the court then upheld the legisla-
tion under the less stringent test that it uses to review facially neutral laws that affect trade. See
Verchick, supra note 29, at 764-65 (noting that court did not apply strict scrutiny standard and
standard actually applied is less stringent than standard for facially neutral trade laws). Under
that test, laws are upheld as long as the burdens on trade are not disproportionate to the aims of
the legislation. Id. at 764-65.
363. See Bradley C. KarkkainenInformation as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Per-
formance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L. J. 257, 348 (2001); see
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Perhaps the most famous register is the United States' Toxic Release Inven-
tory (TRI).3" A PRTR is "an inventory of pollutants released [by industrial
facilities] to air, water and soil, and waste transferred off-site for treatment
and/or disposal."36 Industries must report their emissions of various pollut-
ants to the government, and the government makes the information available
to the public in a database that is usually accessible by computer."e Theoreti-
cally, registers enable the market for environmental rights to operate more
efficiently by reducing information deficit, a traditional market failure.367
Citizens armed with data from the register can "negotiate with polluters to
encourage them to reduce their releases, lobby legislators or agencies to limit
pollution, boycott polluters, or even use the information as the basis for
citizen suits when the information discloses violations of other environmental
laws. s The data enables governments and citizens to identify hot spots and
to target regulatory enforcement efforts to reduce those hot spots, thereby
enhancing environmental justice. The United Nations, at the 1992 Earth
also NGO Conference "Environment Europe," NGO Resolution on the Public Participation
Convention (1998), at http'//www.participate.orglarhus/resolution.htm (last visited June 18,
2001).
364. See 42 U.S.C. §11023(j) (1994).
365. See PRTR Implementation: Member Country Programs, OECD Doe. ENVIEPOC
(2000) 8/FINAL, available at http'/www.oecd.orglehs/ehshomono/00080892.pdf (July 12,
2000) [hereinafter OECD Report] (discussing implementation of Pollutant Release Transfer
Register and progress of implementation by Member countries).
366. See id. at 8 (stating objective of PRTR is to collect data on release of potentially
harmful chemicals). According to OECD, the basic characteristics of a PRTR include "a list of
potentially hazardous chemicals for site-specific reporting, multi-media or integrated reporting
of releases and transfers.. . ; reporting of data by source; periodic (usually annual) reporting;
[and] availability of data and information (generally facility-specific) to the public." Id. at 9.
367. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 150 (noting that increase in disclosure of information
discourages inefficient allocation of market resources).
368. Id.; see also Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, More About
Pollution Release and Transer Registers, at http://www.oecd.org/ehs/prtr/moreprtr.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2000) (citing benefits of PRTR reporting process including encouraging firms
to reduce pollutants). While the United States has the most extensive system for dissemination
of data, other countries and nongovernmental organizations are taking aggressive action to
publicize their data, as well. See OECD Report, supra note 365, at 12 (noting reporting
requirements existing in some countries and how these countries disseminate data). For in-
stance, in the United Kingdom, Friends of the Earth has developed a website that allows citizens
to click on a map to identify the polluters and emission levels in their community. See Friends
of the Earth - UK, FactoryWatch, at http://www.foe.org.ukfcampaignsindustry_and__pollution/
factorywatch (last visited Nov. 7,2000).
369. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 150-51 (discussing benefits of information disclosure
laws); OECD Report, supra note 365, at 8 (elaborating objective of PRTR in gathering informa-
tion for pollution prevention based on individual's country's needs). Promotion of pollution
prevention is a primary goal ofPRTRs. Id. at 11.
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Summit, strongly endorsed pollution release and transfer registers,31 ° and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has devel-
oped guidelines for PRTRs" and issued a recommendation to its Member
States that encourages them to develop and implement PRTRs.372
The European Union created a PRTR as part of the IPPC Directive dis-
cussed earlier in this Article. There are, however, some important differences
betweenthe EU register and the United States' TRI. First, the EU register only
includes releases to air and water.3 It does not include releases to land or
pollution transfers. Second, the EU law only requires reporting of emissions
every three years, as opposed to the annual reporting requirement inthe United
States, and many industrial facilities that the law will cover have not yet been
required to submit any reports.374 Third, unlike the TRI, the EU register does
not include any reporting on pollution prevention efforts.3" Fourth, Member
States provide the information in the EU register while industrial facilities
directly supply the information contained inthe TRI.376 Fifth, although the law
in the United States includes civil, criminal and administrative penalties,377 the
EU law merely requires Member States to take measures to ensure that the
reporting requirements are enforced.37 Finally, while the United States' law
authorizes citizens to sue companies that do not file the information required
370. See Report ofthe United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N.
DocA/ConE151/26Rev.1 (Vol 1) ch. 19, at315 (1993).
371. See generally Guidance Manualfor Governments on PR TR OECD Doe. GD (96) 32
(1996) (providing design and implementation procedures of PRTR to promote environmentally
effective policies).
372. See generally Recommendation of the Council on Implementing Pollutant Release
and Transfer Registries C(96) 41IF!IAL General Distribution available at http'Jwww.oecd.
org//ehs/ehsmono/prc9641e.pdf (March 21, 1996) (listing recommendation of Environmental
Policy Committee).
373. See OECD Repor4 supra note 365, at 9 n.5 (noting that current proposal for European
Pollutant Emission Register only includes water and air releases).
374. See IPPC Directive, supra note 179, art. 15 (providing that Member States public
inventory of principal emissions and sources occur every three years). As noted in the earlier
discussion of the IPPC Directive, new facilities must comply with the Directive by 1999, but
existing facilities have significantly longer to comply. See supra note 181.
375. The Pollution Prevention Act requires companies that must file toxic chemical release
forms to include, in their reports information about source reduction and recycling. See 42
U.S.C. § 13106(a) (1994) (mandating that facility operators include toxic chemical source
reduction and recycling report with annual toxic release form).
376. See Hunter & Muylle, supra note 187, at 10309 (stating that Member States will
provide information for publication in emissions register).
377. See 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (1994) (listing civil, administrative, and criminal penalties for
violations).
378. See IPPC Directive, supra note 179, art. 14 (providingthat Member States take neces-
sary steps to ensure compliance).
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by law and to sue the government if it does not comply with the law, the EU
directive does not require Member States to establish any judicial review
procedures for its citizens."
While some of the Member States have created more ambitious PRTRs
than the EU, they generally are less stringent than the TRI in the United
States. By the end of the last century, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the
Netherlands had developed PRTRs, and Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy,
and Sweden were developing them." 0 Based on data from an OECD Report,
there are several important differences between the European PRTR programs
and the TRI. First, the United States system requires reporting for approxi-
mately two to three times as many pollutants as the European registers.38'
Second, many of the PRTRs outside of the United States do not include
information regarding off-site waste transfers.a Third, few of the other
PRTRs include information about pollution prevention. Nevertheless, most
of the European PRTRs are more ambitious than the EU register, and they
should prove to be useful tools for environmental justice.
B. Environmental Labeling Programs
Environmental labeling programs are similar to pollution register pro-
grams and other information disclosure programs, in that they attempt to
correct information deficit market failures creating a more efficient market for
environmental rights. Sustainable consumption is encouraged by identifying
"environmentally-friendly" products for consumers. 83 While the United States
has established some moderate labeling programs, such as the Energy Star
label for energy efficient electronic products," 4 in 1992 the European Union
created a broad eco-labeling program."' The program was based on the suc-
379. See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (1994) ("Authority to bring civil actions").
380. See OECD Report, supra note 365, at 4,9 (summarizing PRTRs in operation).
381. For instance, the United States system requires reporting on 643 pollutants, compared
to 183 in the United Kingdom, and 180 in the Netherlands. Id. at 72 (listing number of chem-
icals subject to reporting).
382. See id. at 11 (discussing collection of data on off-site waste transfers).
383. See Brinkhorst, supra note 14, at 10 (explaining European Union's goal of promoting
sustainable consumption through such information).
384. See generally United States Environmental Protection Agency, About Energy Star, at
http://www.epa.gov/nrgystarfabout.htnl (last visited Feb. 11, 2001) (discussing Energy Star pro-
gram). The EPA also has embarked on a Consumer Labeling Initiative, working with the special-
ty pesticide industry to develop redesigned labels for products that are easier to read and under-
stand. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Consumer Labeling Initiative, at
http-//www.epa.gov/opptintrlabeling (last visited Feb. 11, 2001) (describing labeling program).
385. See Council Regulation (EEC) 880/92 on a Community Award Scheme for an Eco-
Label, 1992 O.J. (L 99) 1 [hereinafterEUEco-LabelRegulaton] (introducing eco-labeling reg-
ulation).
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cessful programs that many Member States had implemented.s"
The European Commission, assisted by a Committee of representatives
from the Member States,"ss identifies product categories to be covered by the
program and develops criteria for "environmentally friendly" products within
the categories.ss These actions are based on an assessment of the general
impact of products on the environment throughout their life cycle, including
overall waste generation, potential to contaminate soil, air or water, consump-
tion of energy and natural resources, and its impact on the ecosystem."8 9 Thus
far, the European Commission has established criteria for fifteen product cate-
gories.3" Once criteria for a product category exist, producers can voluntarily
apply to have their product certified by representatives in their country as
complying with the criteria.391 Once representatives certify the product, the
producer can advertise the product as complying with the Ecolabeling pro
gram and include the Ecolabel in their advertising.3" To the extent that
labeling programs encourage consumers to purchase more environmentally
friendly products, they reduce overall pollution levels, encourage pollution
386. See Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions, The European Ecolabel,
at http'/Avww.environment.detr.gov.uk/ecolabelrmdexyhtm (last visited Feb. 11, 2001) (dis-
cussing motivations behind ecolabeling scheme) [hereinafter DETR Ecolabel Webpage] The
aims of the EU program are "to promote the design, production, marketing and use of products
which have a reduced environmental impact during their entire life cycle and to provide
consumers with better information on the environmental impacts of products, without compro-
mising product or workers' safety or significantly affecting the properties which make a product
fit for use." EUEco-LabelRegulation, supra note 385, at 2, art. 1.
387. See id. at 3, art. 6 (mandating consultation with specified interest groups). The Com-
mission must also consult with representatives from industries, environmental groups, consumer
organizations, trade unions, and retailers regarding products to be covered, and criteria for the
products. Id. at 2-3, arts. 5, 6 (specifying interest groups to be included in process).
388. See id. at 2, art. 5 ("Product groups and ecological criteria").
389. See id. at 2, art. 5(4) (stating guidelines for establishing product group criteria). The
criteria are set to allow up to 30% of the current market share to qualify for the label. See DETR
Ecolabel Webpage, supra note 386 (discussing requirements for product criteria).
390. See DETR Ecolabel Webpage, supra note 386 (including decision of "How Eco-
labeling Works"). The categories include refrigerators, tissue paper, dishwashers, soil improvers,
bed mattresses, indoor paints and varnishes, footwear, textile products, personal computers, dish-
washer detergents, laundry detergents, copying paper, lightbulbs, portable computers, and wash-
ing machines. Id.
391. See Bird & Veiga-Pestana, supra note 14, at 285 (describing voluntary application
process). The labeling scheme is intended to be self-funding - companies that use the Ecolabel
on their products pay a fee to the Member States to cover the States' cost of processing the
application and administering the program. See DETR Ecolabel Webpage, supra note 386 (dis-
cussing application process). The annual fee is calculated as a percentage of the annual volume
of sales of the product. Id.
392. See EUEco-LabelRegulation, supra note 385, at 3-5, arts. 8, 10, 12, 16 (discussing
eco-label, applications process, terms of use, and advertising).
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prevention, and, therefore, reduce opportunities for pollution to be funneled
to low income communities.
C. Pollution Prevention
Programs and laws that are designed to encourage pollution prevention
can save businesses millions of dollars and enable them to operate more effi-
ciently and they also have obvious benefits for environmental justice.393 Pollu-
tion prevention initiatives can reduce the amount oftoxic substances in the en-
vironment, reduce the potential for accidents and spills in transporting toxics,
and reduce the amount of toxic substances in consumer products. 394 To the
extent that pollution prevention efforts actually reduce pollution, they reduce
the likelihood that low income communities will be disparately impacted by
synergistic or cumulative exposure to multiple pollutants. 39 In the United
States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) considers pollution pre-
vention to be the most effective tool in the battle for environmental justice. 96
However, the United States' pollution prevention efforts have, thus far,
been modest. When Congress enacted the Pollution Prevention Act in 1990,
legislators feared that mandatory requirements would stifle innovation .3  Ac-
cordingly, the law focuses on providing information, grants, and other incen-
tives in order to encourage voluntary pollution prevention. 98 The EPA has
launched other voluntary initiatives, and some States have created mandatory
pollution prevention planning or reporting programs3 99
The European Union has taken a similar approach. While the Treaty of
Rome establishes pollution prevention and source reduction as general princi-
ples of European environmental policy,4" the pollution prevention require-
ments fashioned by the European Union are modest and voluntary. The
centerpiece of the EU pollution prevention efforts is the EcoManagement and
Auditing Scheme (EMAS) that the Council of Ministers created in 1993.
40
1
393. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 143 (discussing relationship between market-based
reforms and environment justice).
394. Id. at 144.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See id. (discussing Congressional concern regarding stifling effects of pollution pre-
vention measures).
398. Id.
399. See id. at 144-45 (describing voluntary pollution prevention programs).
400. See CONsOuIATED EU TREATIES, supra note 18, at254, art 174; see also Brinkhorst,
supra note 14, at 4-5 (enumerating environmental policy principles of treaty).
401. See Council Regulation (EEC) 1836/93 allowing Voluntary Participation in the indus-
trial sector in a community eco-management and audit scheme, 1993 O.J. (L 168) 1 [hereinafter
EMAS Regulation] (introducing eco-management and audit scheme regulation).
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While the scheme focuses on pollution prevention, information disclosure is
also central to the scheme. The EMAS regulation establishes a program in
which a company prepares an environmental management system for itself
that is based on based on several principles, including pollution prevention
and source reduction."° The environmental management system should
include: (1) a definition of management responsibilities in the company for
the environment; (2) a register that outlines the effects that the company's
operations have on the environment;" 3 (3) environmental recordkeeping and
reporting; 0 4 (4) a public environmental statement noting significant environ-
mental issues and emissions;' °s and (5) periodic audits of the company's
management system, and verification of the audits by an external auditor.406
Participation in the program is voluntary, but participating companies can reg-
ister the company with the government of their country and be included in
a list of companies that is published in the Official Journal of the European
Union .4 1 Participating companies also can include a statement in their adver-
tising that indicates that they are participating in the program.0 9 A proposed
revision to the regulation would enable a broader range of companies to par-
ticipate in the scheme and would promote technical assistance programs to
enable small and medium-sized companies to participate.410
402. See id. at 11, Annex I.D (discussing principles to be considered in setting environ-
mental policy).
403. See id. at 9, Annex I.B.3 (requiring compilation of register). In preparing the register,
the company should examine "(1) 'controlled and uncontrolled' releases to air and water,
(2) solid and hazardous wastes; (3) 'contamination of land'; (4) natural resource use; and
(5) 'discharge of thermal energy, noise, odor, dust, vibration and visual impact."' Id. Annex
LB.3 of regulation. The register must also include all legal and policy requirements that are
applicable to its activities, products and services. Id.
404. See id. Annex LB.5 (discussing documentation requirements).
405. See id. at 4, art. 5 (discussing preparation and dissemination of environmental state-
ments). The regulation also requires that the information must be made available to the public.
Id. at 3, art 3(h).
406. See Hunter & Muylle, supra note 187, at 10300, 10303 (describing requirements for
participation in program). Auditors must be accredited and supervised by the Member States
under programs established pursuant to guidance in the regulation. See EMAS Regulation,
supra note 397, art. 6.
407. See EMAS Regulation, supra note 401, at 5, art 8 ("Registration of Sites").
408. See id. at 5, art. 9 ("Publication of the List of Registered Sites").
409. See id. at 5, art. 10 ("Statement of Participation"); see also Hunter & Muylle, supra
note 187, at 10300 (listing entitlements of participation in program).
410. See Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC)
Allowing Voluntary Participation By Organisations in a Community Ecomanagement and
Auditing Scheme (Doe. 599PC0313), at http'//www.europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/com/datl1999/en_
599PC0313.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2001) (discussing amendments to regulation).
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Conclusion
As the United States and the European Union move towards greater
implementation of economic environmental protection measures, they can
learn valuable lessons from each other regarding the availability and viability
of tools that are available to prevent environmental injustice. Several features
of European laws could reduce environmental injustices in the United States
and could be incorporated more fully into United States laws and programs.
For instance, the United States could expand the polluter pays principle to the
broader, and equally just, user pays principle by adopting a wider range of
pollution charges, coupled with subsidies and other complementary measures
that are designed to minimize regressive impacts. Other strong features of
European law that could provide models for the United States include the
Ecolabeling program, the constitutional right to a clean environment, and the
use of human rights protections to prevent environmental harms. At the same
time, European countries could enhance the power of disadvantaged European
communities by amending their laws to include some of the protections
included in United States' freedom of information, information disclosure,
and environmental assessment laws and in the broad public participation and
access to justice provisions of various United States environmental laws. As
environmental protection programs and environmental justice protections of
the European Union and the United States continue to evolve, the countries
must be cognizant of, and learn from, their relative successes and failures.
Environmental justice, and the efficient functioning of the market for environ-
mental rights, depend on it.
